Tuesday, January 26, 2021

A Brief History of Slavery: Its Origins, and How It Invaded America

How did slavery arrive in America? It seems to have come primarily from Asia. When people from northeast Asia invaded America across what is now the Bering Strait, they brought with them the cultures which would take root in South America, Central America, and North America.

After occupying the Americas, these conquerors set up their own civilization, which included a robust program of slavery, as historian Matt Walsh writes:

The institution goes back 10,000 years or more to the Neolithic Revolution. As long as human society has had agriculture, it has had slaves to do the work. The soil on every continent on Earth, save Antarctica, has been tilled by slaves. Slavery was a common and almost unquestioned practice everywhere, all over the world, among nearly all people, for many thousands of years.

Although the word ‘slavery’ is often used, it is still worth pausing to define it. The first element of this definition points to unremunerated labor: slaves work and do not get paid for working, or do not have the right to demand payment, even if they are paid.

A second element of the definition indicates that slaves are treated as property. The property rights which owners can normally exercise over possessions like land and houses are, in conditions of slavery, exercised over human beings.

Although there are variations and differences between, e.g., slavery as practiced by Aztec as compared to the Benin Empire, or as practiced by the Maya as compared to the Kongo, the points of the definition constitute a common thread among regional variations. ‘Kongo’ is the ancient predecessor of the modern Congo. Matt Walsh notes:

Slaves were traded as commodities as far back as Ancient Egypt.

Slavery in any form is dehumanizing. To buy and sell human beings, and to claim the right to treat them in any arbitrary way, even to kill them, — and to claim that right based on their status as property — is why many people find slavery to be a moral monstrosity.

The first recorded effort to undermine the institution of slavery is found in the Mosaic laws. In his legislation, Moses codified temporal limits to slavery — that it would not be a lifelong condition, but rather that slaves would be set free. He also decreed that slaves could not be treated with arbitrary harshness.

While incremental, the laws of Moses were the first significant effort to erode slavery. The effects were slow. Slavery would persist for a few more centuries his own society, and for a few more millennia in other societies.

The foundation of slavery, the reason for its institution and persistence, is primarily economic, as Matt Walsh points out:

Arab traders would conduct their own raids in Africa, capturing African villagers and shipping them back to the Arabian peninsula for sale.

At various times and various places, slavery has been a big business. Certain regional economies have not only allowed slavery, but rather depended on it. This was the case in the southern United States between 1790 and 1865; it was even more the case on other continents, as historian Matt Walsh notes:

In the Sub-Saharan slave trade, established about 1,000 years before the United States came into being, young boys were routinely castrated and then sold into forced labor in Asia, the Middle East, or within Africa. It’s worth noting that slavery was not fully abolished in Africa until 1981.

Slavery was practiced at some point in time or another in almost every part of the world. Europe was the first large region to eradicate slavery. The long-term ripple effects of the Mosaic innovation drove the Europeans to abolish slavery. The anti-slavery movements in North America, typified in individuals like Roger Williams, who led the movement which abolished slavery in Rhode Island in the 1650s, was a direct outgrowth of European culture, which was in turn an extension of Mosiac legal and ethical logic.

Although the forms and goals of slavery changed when European settlers arrived in the Americas, its basic nature did not. Because slavery de-humanizes and objectifies the slave, the slave is perceived as an “other” — the natives of the Americas, before the arrival of Europeans, treated people who were not of their own tribe as “other” and often enslaved them, as Matt Walsh explains:

Slavery was commonplace in the Americas well before European settlers showed up. Native American tribes enslaved each other, often by conquest and capture.

The civilizations of the Americas routinely practiced human sacrifice before the arrival of Europeans. The connection between slavery and the pre-religious superstitious phase of human sacrifice is clear: The slave would have no choice about being a vicitim of these rituals.

In Mesoamerica, a slave would often have his period of servitude ended when he was ritualistically butchered as a human sacrifice, which was a widespread practice in the region for hundreds of years.

Slavery has not been entirely eradicate from the world. It persists, even in places where it is technically illegal. There are still markets where human beings are bought and sold like animals.

While slavery persists in some remote areas, most modern nations have succeeded in erasing it from their societies, and most cultures have solidified an anti-slavery ethic among their people.

China had slavery for 3,000 years and only officially abolished it in the 20th century, though unofficially it still exists today.

Slavery existed in ancient times in nearly every part of the world. It came to the Americas many centuries prior to the first European settlers. The social and cultural forces which led to the end of slavery made themselves first felt in the Ancient Near East, next in Europe, and then in the Americas.

When the United States ended slavery between 1863 and 1865, other nations followed the example: Brazil ended its slavery sytem in 1888, Cuba in 1886, and Madegascar in 1896. Egypt, Morocco, Yemen, China, and Thailand followed suit in the twentieth century.

Saturday, December 26, 2020

Communism Is a Product of the Wealthy Elite: The Poor Do Not Embrace Marxism

The international communist conspiracy has so thoroughly permeated educational institutions and the media that its propaganda is now assumed as common wisdom. What has become a familiar telling of events is a deliberate — and often successful — attempt to hide events.

According to the usual narrative, communism and socialism are embraced and promoted by poor people, by exploited workers, in a bid for justice and better treatment. In reality, communism and socialism are created and promoted by the wealthy elite, as historian John Stormer writes:

Communism is commonly believed to rise out of poverty. Yet, Fidel Castro was a product, not of the cane fields of Cuba, but of the halls of Havana University.

Karl Marx, it will be remembered, was the child of an upper-middle-class family, and received an exclusive university education. His father was a successful lawyer, and his parents owned a vineyard. Never during his lifetime did Karl Marx work for a wage, or work to support himself and his family. Instead, his efforts went into speechmaking, writing, and organizing, as he lived off of the privilege of his family and his wealthy supporters.

In the course of contradicting the propaganda which is nearly omnipresent in textbooks and classrooms, two questions will arise: Why would the wealthy support communism and socialism, if those ideologies advocate the dismantling of their privilege? Why would the poor not enthusiastically embrace the ideas which claim to liberate the downtrodden?

Among the elite supporters of communism and socialism, one may discern two types. On the one hand, there is the naive believer, who with true goodwill thinks that he will help his fellow man by advocating for these beliefs. On the other hand, there is the cynic, who understands that any attempted implementation of these ideologies will inevitably result in a concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a few.

Among the poor, there are many who understand that communism and socialism are systems which fail to generate opportunities. Yet that is precisely what the poor need and want: a chance at something better.

There are those in poverty who are deceived into supporting some communist or socialist movement, but they are often quickly alerted to the fact that their lives do not improve after the installation of some government which bears the name of these ideologies.

Joseph Stalin was not a simple peasant rebelling at the oppression of the Czar. He became a communist while studying for the priesthood in a Russian Orthodox seminary.

It is the case, in every instance of a political takeover by a government which represents, or claims to represent, these ideologies, that the poor find no relief. Not only that, but the poor are often subjected to greater hardship under their alleged benefactors.

This is the situation in every case in which such a takeover has happened. It is also the situation in any conceivable or possible scenario of a such a takeover.

The instigators, leaders, and promoters of communism and socialism are inevitably wealthy, privileged, and elite. It is difficult to find a revolutionary leader who was a member of the lower classes. Examples from Russia in 1917, to China between 1927 and 1949, and in Cuba between 1953 and 1959, are representative of other communist revolutions in history, as John Stormer details:

Dr. Cheddi Jagan, communist premier of British Guiana, became a communist, not as an “exploited” worker on a plantation of a British colonial colony, but as a dental student at Chicago’s Northwestern University.

It is necessary to articulate statements which are nearly the exact opposite of what is commonly believed: Communism and socialism are created and promoted by the wealthy, the privileged, and the elite, for the purpose of maintaining and increasing their wealth and power. The notion that communism and socialism intend to, or can, help the poor is a notion created to deceive, to dupe naive but well-intentioned people into helping the communist and socialist movements. The poor and the working class generally reject communism: some do so outright, seeing that it fails to offer them opportunities; others do so only after learning the bitter lesson of having at first supported these movements, only later to be alerted to the harsh reality that these movements will simply worsen their lot.

Tuesday, November 24, 2020

Numbers and Statistics: Understanding the Coronavirus Pandemic

Worldwide discussions bring clarity, but often not answers, to questions about the COVID-19 pandemic, because investigations are removed from the political debates within any single nation. As calmer investigations, not overheated by regional politics, proceed, it is clear that one key word is “estimation,” indicating that numbers presented about the virus are not definite, but rather merely preliminary.

Into nearly every sentence written or spoken about the Coronavirus, the adverbs “probably” or “approximately” should be inserted, if they are not already present. The phrase “on average” should also be added.

It is perhaps excusable, but nonetheless wrong, to see any number as indicating a precise value. In the case of a virus, the existence of which was not known as recently as a year ago, any number must be seen as an educated guess.

When the pandemic first gained the attention of the world in March 2020, several months after low-level media reporting and a bit of biological research had begun, any numbers used in reporting about the virus were vague and often off-target by an order of magnitude, as this November 2020 newspaper text from Michigan suggests:

When on March 10 the state announced its first two cases, 532 people already were sick with what was later confirmed to be coronavirus.

The real number was many times that. University of California Berkeley researchers have estimated for every confirmed case in the spring, Michigan had 12 undetected cases.

The testing mechanisms for the virus were hastily-developed. Significant numbers of false positives and false negatives were present but often ignored in the summary conclusions drawn from the crude data.

In urban areas, the concern is cases going undetected because people can have coronavirus and not realize it. University of Michigan epidemiologist Ryan Malosh cited estimates of “three to six missed cases” for every one confirmed.

Further ambiguity affected the numbers as the precise percentage of asymptomatic, or mildly symptomatic, cases was unknown. Every estimate of that percentage seemed to be higher than the last, but remained a mere guess.

Pathologists in Germany, for example, argued about how many people died from COVID-19. Of those patients whose death certificates indicated Coronavirus as the cause of death, some researchers guessed that as many as 85% of them died of that cause. Other researchers indicated that fewer than 50% died from COVID-19.

The ordinary newspaper-reading citizen is left bewildered. If major research universities can’t sort this out, who can? The fact remains that many questions about the pandemic remain unanswered, and will likely remain so for several years.

Wednesday, August 19, 2020

The Climate is Safer Now: Fewer Climate-Related Disasters

In 2019, an inexperienced Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez stated that “the world is going to end in twelve years if we don’t address climate change.” She quickly faced a barrage of criticism, even from climate activists and from the leaders within her own political party, to retract the statement.

Angry because she’d been called out by members of her own Democratic Party and by fellow climate activists, the congresswoman, affectionately known as AOC, attempted to fine-tune her message via one of her appointees, as Michael Shellenberger writes:

An AOC spokesperson told Axios, “We can quibble about the phraseology, whether it’s existential or cataclysmic.” But, he added, “We’re seeing lots of [climate change–related] problems that are already impacting lives.”

But if that’s the case, the impact is dwarfed by the 92 percent decline in the decadal death toll from natural disasters since its peak in the 1920s. In that decade, 5.4 million people died from natural disasters. In the 2010s, just 0.4 million did. Moreover, that decline occurred during a period when the global population nearly quadrupled.

In fact, both rich and poor societies have become far less vulnerable to extreme weather events in recent decades. In 2019, the journal Global Environmental Change published a major study that found death rates and economic damage dropped by 80 to 90 percent during the last four decades, from the 1980s to the present.

Humans are now less likely to suffer from climate-related or climate-caused disasters. The predicted droughts aren’t causing the migrations of thousands of refugees. The predicted rising of sea levels hasn’t devastated towns and villages around the world.

For humans on planet Earth, life expectancy has risen over the last two decades, and the number of people living in poverty has decreased. Although climate activists have predicted disaster and misery since the 1990s, and perhaps even earlier, those predictions have shown themselves to be inaccurate.

Wednesday, July 1, 2020

The Beginning of the End of Chiang’s Government in China: Espionage Networks Pave the Way for the Communist Takeover

In early 1941, Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of China, obtained information from his military intelligence communities that Japan was not only going to continue its war against China, but rather that it was also going to expand its war effort to attack additionally the various nations of southeast China. The expansion of Japanese aggression beyond China and into southeast Asia meant war with Britain and France, because southeast Asia was composed mainly of British and French colonies.

Even before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, U.S. involvement in the Pacific war was inevitable. America would enter the conflict because of its alliances with Australia, Britain, and France, and also because the Philippines and other islands in the area were U.S. protectorates, territories, or possessions.

As the leader of China, Chiang Kai-shek welcomed U.S. and British involvement in the war, because it meant that China would have allies against Japan. Until that point in time, China had faced Japan almost alone.

Chiang, however, was fighting two wars at once. The external war was Japan’s attack on, and invasion of, China. The internal war was a raging civil war between Chiang’s government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Starting in 1927, the CCP had been committed to the violent overthrow of the Chinese government. Lasting over two decades, the Chinese Civil War would leave millions dead.

When the Japanese attacked China in 1937, a ceasefire in the civil war was declared, and the CCP promised to cooperate with the Chinese government in a mutual effort to defend China against the Japanese. But the CCP kept its promise at best partially. The soldiers of the CCP were organized into the “New Fourth Army,” which was supposed to coordinate its activities with the armies of China and take orders from the Chinese high command. But the Fourth Army sometimes didn’t follow orders, or did so only deliberate delay.

As dangerous as the Communists were, however, Chiang was forced to pay more attention to the Japanese invasion, because it presented a more urgent danger. He was delighted that the United States would support China against Japan. But what he didn’t know was that the U.S. representative, sent to facilitate cooperation between America and China, was actually a Soviet spy.

Neither the U.S. government, which sent Lauchlin Currie to China as its representative, nor the Chinese government which happily received him, realized that he was part of a Soviet Socialist espionage network, as historian Jay Taylor writes:

This development was good news for Chiang. Despite all the staggering defeats, failures, and losses of the past three years, as well as the stupendous problems of trying to run a government, economy, and army in exile and of virtual international isolation, Chiang had remained steadfast in his belief that he and China would eventually prevail over Japan. Because of the Soviet factor, he would never be as certain about the ultimate outcome of the struggle with Mao’s CCP, but that problem could be tackled later. What was important now was that while the Fourth Army Incident and its aftermath were still reverberating inside China, the informal Sino-American alliance was developing rapidly. Most importantly, President Roosevelt had included China in his new and dramatic Lend-Lease Bill, which was intended primarily to save England through the provision of vast amounts of war matériel. The President had also decided to send a personal representative to talk with Chiang. The representative, Lauchlin Currie, played a key role in the White House on Far Eastern affairs, although his official titles of personal economic adviser and administrative assistant to the President had nothing to do with foreign affairs and he knew little or nothing about China. Currie, however, had another unusual distinction — he was a member of a group of officials in Washington whom Moscow considered its “agents of influence.” Most of these men and women were motivated by personal ideals, sympathy for the Soviet Union, hatred of fascism, and liberal economic and social views. Some, like Currie, were not members of the Communist Party and probably were at most democratic-socialists, but they believed that the fascist threat overrode most other considerations and that in promoting the interests of Moscow and providing it sensitive information they were also serving the interests of their own country. They would have objected to being called “agents of influence,” but at the minimum they showed atrocious judgment. After all, the Soviet Union was then allied to Nazi Germany, suggesting that their ideological motivations were not, after all, primarily antifascist.

Currie’s assignment from President Roosevelt was to liaise between the United States and China, specifically for the purpose of bolstering the war effort against Japan. But Currie’s own objective was to undermine the Chinese government and strengthen the CCP’s attempts to overthrow that government.

Chiang Kai-shek was happy to receive aid from the United States. He made substantial requests for more.

When Chiang received Currie in Chungking on February 10, the American informed him that the United States would soon deliver to China US$45 million of arms and military equipment. After an expression of thanks, Chiang also asked for financial assistance to help stabilize the Chinese currency (the fabi), and assistance in improving the Burma Road. But this was only the beginning. On March 31, T.V. Soong presented Currie a comprehensive request on behalf of the commander in chief, including 1,000 military aircraft and arms for thirty divisions. Some of the airplanes were needed to equip a new Chinese Air Force unit to be led by Claire Chennault, a crusty, retired U.S. Army Air Force Captain with the “honorific” title of Colonel. Since 1937, Chennault had been advising Chiang and directing the training of what remained of the Chinese Air Force.

The connection to the U.S. was vital to the Chinese war effort. Yet that connection had to go, in part, through Lauchlin Currie, a permanent enemy of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese government.

The Soviet Socialist government was at that time allied with Hitler’s National Socialist (“Nazi”) government.

The Soviets were also allied with the CCP. Hitler was allied with the Japanese, who had invaded and were still attacking China.

So the civil war inside China, between the CCP and Chiang’s nationalist government, was linked to the war outside China, with the CCP allied to the Nazis, the Soviets, and the Japanese, while Chiang’s government was allied to the United States.

The 1937 ceasefire between the CCP and Chiang’s government was tenuous at best. Both sides were as eager to fight each other as they were to fight the Japanese.

Thus Chiang was shocked when Lauchlin Currie flatly stated that the CCP and Chiang’s government should consolidate and form a united front against the Japanese:

Currie also passed on to Chiang Roosevelt’s hope that the KMT and the CCP would be able to form a true united front to fight Japan. Taken aback, Chiang replied that it was his view that the CCP’s principal loyalty was to the Communist International and the Soviet Union. The Communists, he said, did not want to see an alliance among China, America, and Britain. At the time, Chiang’s assertion was an undeniable fact. But Currie did not agree with any of these premises and he left Chiang with the clear impression that in the coming war, the Americans would have one goal — defeat of the Germans and the Japanese — and since the CCP was part of the united front against Japan, it would also be considered a friend. Chiang understood that his strikingly different view of the CCP would bedevil the most important foreign relationship he and his government would ever have. But aside from this issue, Chiang was immensely pleased by the visit — an alliance with the powerful United States seemed likely within a year.

Because Lauchlin Currie was operating as part of the Soviet espionage network, he was indifferent to Chiang’s assessments of the situation in China, indifferent to Chiang’s requests, and indifferent to Chiang’s views. But Currie was eager to relay opinions and requests of the CCP to the U.S. government.

Chiang’s political party was called the Kuomintang (KMT). The CCP worked to form a negative impression of the KMT in Currie’s mind, a false impression which Currie would then carry back to Washington, D.C.

Before leaving Chungking, Currie met privately with Zhou Enlai, who was very positive and convivial, portraying the Communists as patriotic reformers interested in democracy and full of praise for the idea of U.S. support for China against Japan. Zhou, however, warned that the KMT leader’s policies could lead to a civil war and a collapse of the resistance. He was not so frank as to mention that his party at that moment continued vehemently to oppose a U.S.-China alliance, fearing that Japan’s defeat by such a partnership would give Chiang a powerful claim to leadership.

Currie faithfully carried Zhou Enlai’s pro-communist messages back to Washington, D.C.

(Because of varying transliteration, Zhou Enlai is also known as Chou En-Lai.)

Lauchlin Currie was only one of several Soviet agents who were working inside the U.S. government. These operatives had a number of tasks. One of them was to weaken American enthusiasm for Chiang’s government, and thereby aid the CCP in its efforts to overthrow that government.

The international communist conspiracy, promoted by the Soviet Socialists, did indeed eventually influence America’s policy. As seen above, the U.S. wanted a united front between the CCP and Chiang. It was hopelessly naive to imagine that the Chinese communists would work together with Chiang’s government to defend China against the Japanese.

The CCP would rather wait while Japan shredded China and Chiang’s government, which would make it easier for the Communists to assume control, once the country and the government were thus weakened. The CCP was allied with the Soviet Socialists, who were, in turn, allied with Japan and with the Nazis. The Chinese Communists were thus allied with Japan.

In Washington, Currie and others succeeded in reducing the amount of aid which Chiang would receive from the United States. By influencing U.S. foreign policy this way, Lauchlin Currie and the other Soviet spies inside the American government contributed to the final downfall of Chiang’s government in 1949, contributed to the establishment of a ruthless Communist dictatorship in China, and contributed to the death of millions of Chinese.

The fact that the Communists took control of China has led to an amazing number of deaths. Between 1958 and 1961, the CCP operated a program known as ‘The Great Leap Forward.’ The result was the starvation of at least 30 million Chinese people, the execution of at least 2.5 million, and the forced suicides of at least another 1 million. These numbers represent the lower end of the ranges reported.

The CCP organized another wave of violence from 1966 to 1976 and called it ‘The Cultural Revolution.’ Estimates vary substantially: the CCP executed between 1 million and 20 million people during this program.

The Great Leap Forward and The Cultural Revolution were the two most violent periods of Communism’s rule over China. Other periods also included mass executions and the deaths of prisoners in camps.

Lauchlin Currie does not bear sole responsibility for the millions of Chinese who suffered and died. The fall of Chiang’s government and the rise of the CCP led to one of the most horrifying catastrophes in history: it led to mass murder and it led to the widespread violation of human rights in China.

Thursday, June 18, 2020

Controversy Among Historians: What Caused WWII?

In most history textbooks, the beginning of WW2 is placed either at Hitler’s invasion of Poland in 1939, or more accurately, at Japan’s 1937 invasion of China. Some more nuanced authors might even assign it to Japan’s 1931 invasions of Manchuria.

In any case, the starting point of the war is one thing; its causes are another.

Many authors simply identify the war’s causes as irrational militaristic national socialism on Hitler’s part, and as irrational militaristic imperialism on Japan’s part. These explanations seem simplistic, a sort of deus ex machina, and attribute the world’s most horrifying war to mental illness among a very small handful of people.

Reflection will hint at the notion that there must be more to the story. Millions of people aren’t mobilized based on a dozen people’s mental illness. The scores of other nations involved in the conflict didn’t declare war simply because of psychological illness among a tiny number of people.

By analyzing the diplomatic interactions between various nations in the late 1930s, historian A.J.P. Taylor argues that WW2 could have been avoided, had British diplomats taken certain steps. Taylor’s book is controversial — some scholars disagree passionately with Taylor — and the academic study of history generally abstains from counterfactual speculation. Nonetheless, Taylor’s writings are fascinating.

In the final days before the war in Europe began, diplomats were working feverishly to avoid armed conflict. On August 30, 1939, the Nazi government offered a compromise solution to Poland; the disagreement had been over city of Danzig, a German city which the Poles had annexed in the wake of WW1.

The compromise offer extended by Hitler’s government on August 30, called for the Poles to release Danzig to return to Germany, but offered the Poles continued economic rights in the city. The countryside surrounding the city would have a referendum, an election allowing it to decide for itself whether it would stay with Poland or return to German citizenship.

Had Poland even considered the offer — not necessarily accepted it — it would have bought more time for diplomats to seek further compromises and negotiations. But Poland rejected the offer outright.

The grave complicating factor was Britain’s treaty with Poland, signed in early 1939, which guaranteed British support should Poland find itself in a war with the Nazis. Had Britain not signed such a treaty in the first place, or had it found a way out of the treaty in the second place, Poland would have had a motive to find a peaceful solution to the Danzig situation. As it was, Poland felt confident that it could take on the Nazis, and the Soviet Union as Hitler’s ally, because it expected that both France and Britain would defend against Nazi and Soviet attacks on Poland.

In the wake of Poland’s refusal to negotiate, the Nazis declared war on Poland, and military action began on September 1, 1939.

Had the war remained a local conflict between Germany and Poland, it would have been small and brief.

Britain, however, faced a momentous decision: would it abide by its agreement to defend Poland? Would France do the same? The British government briefly considered alternatives, e.g., a negotiated ceasefire with Germany. In the end, Britain declared war on Germany. France did likewise.

French diplomat Georges Bonnet worked, in the very last hours, to stop the declaration of war. He hoped to draw Mussolini, who at the time was not strongly bound to Hitler, to apply pressure on Germany. France, like Britain, was bound by treaty to Poland, and Poland expected the French to launch a major military offensive against Germany’s western border. Such an attack would have diverted German troops from the attack on Poland. But the French had no intention of mounting such an attack.

Bonnet’s frantic, last-minute efforts are chronicled by A.J.P. Taylor:

Yet both the British and French governments, the French especially, went on believing in a conference which had vanished before it was born. Hitler had initially replied to Mussolini that, if invited to a conference, he would give his answer at mid-day on 3 September. Therefore Bonnet, and Chamberlain with him, strove desperately to postpone a declaration of war until after that time, even though the Italians no longer intended to invite Hitler or anyone else. Bonnet conjured up the excuse that the French military wanted the delay in order to carry through mobilisation, undisturbed by German air attack (which, they knew, would not occur anyway — the German air force was fully employed in Poland). Chamberlain conjured up no excuse except that the French wanted delay and that it was always difficult to work with allies. In the evening of 2 September he was still entertaining the House of Commons with hypothetical negotiations: “If the German Government should agree to withdraw their forces then His Majesty’s Government would be willing to regard the position as being the same as it was before the German forces crossed the Polish frontier. That is to say, the way would be open to discussion between the German and Polish Governments on the matters at issue”.

Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939. It was, at that point in time, a largely symbolic act. Britain had few combat-ready military units, and none were near Poland, nor could they be in Poland soon. No significant French or British military action began immediately.

The debate inside the British government was intense. Neville Chamberlain spoke indecisively in Parliament. When Chamberlain was done speaking, Arthur Greenwood rose to speak, encouraged by fellow MP Leo Amery, demanding more decisive action.

Thus it was possible for both France and Britain to continue to seek a diplomatic solution, although they did so clumsily. So even after a declaration of war, before major hostilities commenced, communications between the countries continued:

This was too much even for loyal Conservatives. Leo Amery called to Arthur Greenwood, acting leader of the Opposition: “Speak for England”, a task of which Chamberlain was incapable. Ministers, led by Simon, warned Chamberlain that the government would fall unless it sent an ultimatum to Hitler before the House met again. Chamberlain gave way. The objections of the French were overruled. The British ultimatum was delivered to the Germans at 9 a.m. on 8 September. It expired at 11 a.m., and a state of war followed. When Bonnet learnt that the British were going to war in any case, his overriding anxiety was to catch up with them. The time of the French ultimatum was advanced, despite the supposed objections of the General Staff: it was delivered at noon on 8 September and expired at 5 p.m. In this curious way the French who had preached resistance to Germany for twenty years appeared to be dragged into war by the British who had for twenty years preached conciliation. Both countries went to war for that part of the peace settlement which they had long regarded as least defensible. Hitler may have projected a great war all along; yet it seems from the record that he became involved in war through launching on 29 August a diplomatic manoeuvre which he ought to have launched on 28 August.

Winston Churchill emerges, in A.J.P. Taylor’s account, as having blundered England into war — a war that might have been avoidable. Under closer examination, Churchill emerges as a mixed figure: on the one hand, his moral instincts were outraged at Hitler’s aggressiveness, and he also nobly wished to preserve the British empire; but on the other hand, Churchill’s irrational hatred of Germany, which predated Hitler by many decades, may have propelled him, and Britain with him, too hastily into war, a war which turned out to be a pyrrhic victory for Britain, which proceeded to lose its empire in the immediate postwar years, having overextended itself in the war.

Some British historians have opposed Taylor’s account of the events of the 1930s, because this narrative would mean that Britain, and to a lesser extent France, was in a position to avert, or at least diminish the war.

If Taylor is correct, the war could have been contained, and would have been a local conflict between Germany and Poland. The Soviet Union wouldn’t have been pulled in.

The world will probably never know whether or not Taylor is correct. Counterfactuals do not belong to the realm of documented or evidential history. But Taylor’s investigations and detailed narratives, in any case, direct attention to often-ignored aspects and events of the late 1930s.

Thursday, June 4, 2020

South Korean Passiveness and Chinese Elusiveness Fuel North Korean Human Rights Violations

In 1910, Japanese soldiers had invaded and occupied Korea. At the end of WW2 in 1945, the United States Army liberated the southern half of the Korean peninsula, and Japan withdrew its armies from Korea. The Soviet Socialists invaded and occupied the northern half of the Korean peninsula.

Since that time, the two countries of North Korea and South Korea have lived next to each other in a very uneasy arrangement. In June 1950, North Korea attacked and invaded South Korea, beginning the Korean War.

North Korea calls itself the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK.

The United Nations organized a coalition of at least sixteen nations to help defend South Korea. That coalition included Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Greece, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and others.

North Korea was supported by China and by the Soviet Socialists.

In July 1953, an armistice was signed. An ‘armistice’ is something like a ‘ceasefire’ agreement. The fighting stopped, but the war was not officially ended. A peace treaty between the two countries has not been signed, so the Korean War has been continuing for over seventy years, even though there has been no combat for over sixty-seven years.

The political and social structures which developed in North Korea constituted one of the harshest totalitarian dictatorships in the world. The Soviet Socialists installed Kim Il-sung to be the country’s absolute ruler, as historian Doug Bandow writes:

During the Soviet occupation, religious persecution in the northern half of the peninsula went from bad to worse. The Bolsheviks waged war on Christianity in the USSR and were no more friendly when occupying Korea. The Soviets chose Kim Il-sung, an anti-Japanese guerrilla leader, to rule the occupation zone. Once the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was established in 1948, “the regime suppressed religious freedom by arousing the sense of struggle against anti-revolutionary elements and spreading anti-religious sentiments far and wide to strengthen the socialist revolutionary force,” write Yeo-sang Yoon and Sun-young Han, of the North Korean Human Rights Archives and Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, respectively.

Kim Il-sung ruled the country with an iron hand until his death in 1994. His son, Kim Jong-il, inherited the power and was no less ruthless than his father.

After decades of tyranny, the people of North Korea were among the very poorest in the world. Malnutrition was rampant, and many died of starvation. The DPRK is utterly indifferent to its people’s human rights. In this midst of poverty and misery, however, Kim Jong-il lived a life of luxury. United States President George Bush took office in early 2001, and describes what he learned during his first interactions with the North Korean government:

Meanwhile, Kim Jong-il cultivated his appetite for fine cognac, luxury Mercedes, and foreign films. He built a cult of personality that required North Koreans to worship him as a godlike leader. His propaganda machine claimed that he could control the weather, had written six renowned operas, and had scored five holes in one during his first round of golf.

President Bush worked with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to deal with North Korea. Any agreements made by Kim Jong-il were not to be trusted.

North Korea had signed a treaty called the ‘Agreed Framework’ in 1994. It immediately became clear that it had no intention of living up to the promises it made in the treaty. Condoleezza Rice explains how she and President Bush understood the North Korean government:

As noted before, the President had rejected any return to the Agreed Framework with North Korea because he — and all of us — believed it to be flawed. The North Koreans had taken the benefits, including $4.5 billion to build two light-water reactors, but by late 2002 they were once again threatening to expel all nuclear inspectors and restart plutonium-reprocessing facilities at Yongbyon. That was a familiar pattern with the North Koreans. As President Bush put it, “He [Kim Jong-il] throws his food on the floor, and all the adults run to gather it up and put it back on the table. He waits a little while and throws his food on the floor again.” It was an apt description, but, given the consequences of conflict on the Korean peninsula, there didn’t seem to be many alternatives.

In violation of its own promises, as well as global diplomatic consensus, North Korea began to work with Syria on a project to build a nuclear reactor at a location known as al-Kibar. This reactor would have produced the materials needed to build atomic bombs.

The thought that North Korea and Syria would each have an arsenal of nuclear weapons caused concern throughout the world. Yet it was an entirely predictable development, given North Korea’s pattern of behavior. At the time, in the year 2002, Richard “Dick” Cheney was the Vice President of the United States. He explains:

By the time we came into office, the North Koreans had an established pattern of behavior. They would make an agreement about their nuclear sites, pocket the benefits of the agreement, and then continue on with their weapons programs. They were masters of brinksmanship — creating problems, threatening their neighbors, and expecting to be bribed back into cooperation. It had usually worked for them. In 1994, with Bill Clinton in the White House, they agreed to freeze their plutonium production program in exchange for 500,000 metric tons of fuel oil a year and two reactors of a type that cannot easily be used to produce weapons material. But they secretly pursued a second route. In 2002, with the North Koreans having received millions of tons of fuel oil and with the al-Kibar reactor construction under way, an American delegation confronted them with evidence of their deception, and they admitted they had been developing a second way to produce nuclear weapons — by enriching uranium.

Not only did the North Korean government routinely violate its own treaties and break its promises, but it delighted in shocking the world through unpredictable behavior and by threatening neighboring nations with its military weapons.

In July 2006, North Korean suddenly tested its long-range missiles. These “tests” weren’t only a way to measure the missile’s technical abilities. They were threats to nearby countries. Donald Rumsfeld was the United States Secretary of Defense at that time, and recalls:

The leaders of the so-called Hermit Kingdom had a penchant for rattling sabers around American holidays. In the weeks running up to July 4 there had been some speculation that the North Korean regime might fire a long-range missile. No one was certain of their intentions, but the possibilities included a simple test, a demonstration firing, or a launch to place an object in space. The North Koreans could do something even more provocative, and our allies in South Korea and Japan didn’t want to be ill prepared in case missiles were aimed toward their territory. The erratic Kim Jong Il might even swing for the fences and attempt to hit our country.

By late 2006, North Korea succeeded in building its first atomic bomb. In 2007, Israel would destroy the al-Kibar nuclear facility in the course of fighting between Syria and Israel.

In 2011, Kim Jong-il died, and his son, Kim Jong-un inherited the power.

The United Nations, and individual countries around the world, have often looked to China to help manage North Korea. China is not exactly an ally of North Korea, but it is the nation with the least bad relationship to North Korean.

On the one hand, China isn’t exactly friendly with North Korea. On the other hand, China isn’t exactly friendly with most of the world’s other nations. So while China can sometimes help negotiate with North Korea, it isn't strongly motivated to do so.

At the time of the 1994 Agreed Framework, U.S. military analysts speculated about what China might do in the event that North Korea would become involved in a war. If the war were instigated and begun by North Korea, it was presumed that China would not lend military support to North Korea, would work to end hostilities, and could pressure the DPRK by reducing or ending Chinese exports to North Korea.

If, on the other hand, a war in the mid-1990s had begun because of a South Korean or American action, or if such a war had included the movement of South Korean or American troops across the border into North Korea, then the Pentagon concluded that China might well send forces to support the DPRK.

American military strategists reached those hypothetical conclusions in the mid-1990s. But how might China act now, twenty or forty years later? In 2013, Robert Wampler wrote:

Whether that would still be the case today is an open question, but China’s perspective does seem to have changed recently. Whereas it refused to back U.N. sanctions two decades ago, last month it supported (and in fact helped the United States draft) new U.N. sanctions in response to North Korea’s recent nuclear test. That suggests it sees an increased need to rein in the North Korean regime and has a decreased tolerance for destabilizing actions. In public, Beijing has stressed that it will not accept "troublemaking on China’s doorstep." While it is not likely that China will abandon its North Korean ally given its fear of unknown consequences, its analysts may well be scratching their heads (as their American counterparts are), asking what Kim Jong Un’s endgame is — or whether he even has one. And, if a war breaks out, will prior consultations between Washington and Beijing reassure the Chinese that our own endgame does not threaten their core interests or require military action to keep trouble away from their doorstep?

While North Korea continues to develop its missiles and the atomic weapons which they carry, the people of North Korea continue to starve, as Frank Jannuzi writes:

Amnesty International has long chronicled the DPRK's endemic human rights abuses, under which millions suffer. That suffering takes many forms. Food insecurity and malnutrition are widespread, and there are persistent reports of starvation, particularly in more remote regions. The country's famines have been under-reported inside and outside the DPRK because of severe restrictions of movement and a near-total clamp-down on expression, information, and association.

Some observers argue that South Korea has been unwilling to confront North Korea. Often it has been the United Nations, the United States, China, or some coalition of other nations putting pressure on the DPRK.

Edward Luttwak conjectures that a more active, and more courageous, role for South Korea could be essential in persuading North Korea to behave better. He describes a pattern in which the DPRK bullies South Korea into funding North Korean activities, and in which South Korea passively endures DPRK aggressiveness. Luttwak cites the South Korean naval ship Cheonan, the sinking of which is often though not unanimously attributed to the DPRK:

Unwilling to deter North Korea — which would require a readiness to retaliate for its occasionally bloody attacks and constant provocations, thereby troubling business and roiling the Seoul stock market — South Korea has instead preferred to pay off the regime with periodic injections of fuel and food aid, but most consistently by way of the North-South Kaesong industrial zone, in which some 80,000 North Korean workers are paid relatively good wages by South Korean corporations. The workers themselves receive very little of their salaries, of course, the majority of which gets funneled back to Pyongyang and makes up the North’s largest consistent source of foreign currency. Even under supposedly “hard-line” South Korean presidents, the Kaesong transfer has continued. It was not shut down when the North sunk South Korea’s Cheonan warship, killing 46 sailors; nor when the North opened artillery fire on a South Korean island, killing two soldiers and two civilians; nor when the North tested a nuclear device and launched a long-range ballistic missile. Even as the present crisis has unfolded, it was the paying South that feared an interruption of production at Kaesong, not the North, which reaps the benefits. And when media in South Korea noted with much relief that Kaesong was still open, the North Koreans promptly shut it down.

The nations of the world, then, divided as they are by questions of ideology and economics, are united in their frustration with Kim Jong-un. Any interaction with the DPRK is an exercise in futility. Agreements are signed by the North Koreans, and afterwards, it becomes clear that the DPRK had no intention of keeping its word.

Even though countries differ greatly by culture and religion, diplomacy still relies on some manner of trust and promise. In this sense, diplomacy with North Korea has proven, thus far at least, impossible.

The international community looks to China, as the one nation which has the least bad relationship with the DPRK, to steer these troubled diplomatic relationships. Whether China can do it is one question; whether China wants to do it is another.

In this uncomfortable and murky status quo, South Korea passively endures North Korean bullying while the citizens of the DPRK suffer poverty and malnutrition to degrees barely imaginable. North Korean citizens still die of malnutrition and starvation, their human rights ignored. Active military combat ended in 1953, but there is no doubt that a war is still going on.