Wednesday, July 20, 2022

Is a Peaceful North Korea Possible?

As a country, belligerence seems innate to North Korea. The nation was created by the USSR, shaped by the harshest versions of Stalinism, and responsible for starting the Korean War with a surprise attack on South Korea. Millions of people died in that war. North Korea, which was founded in 1945 by the Soviets and ruled by their chosen dictator Kim Il-sung, formally became the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948.

The DPRK has been identified by global organizations — the UN, NATO, SEATO, the G7, the G20, and others — for its brutal inhumanity. It arrests, beats, imprisons, tortures, and murders its citizens for offenses like possessing certain books or failing to be sufficiently enthusiastic about the regime. That regime started with Kim Il-sung in 1945, was inherited by Kim Jong-il in 1994, and inherited by Kim Jong-un in 2011: a hereditary dynasty of dictators.

Recalling the North Korean situation as it stood during the first decade of the new millennium — the decade in which the DPRK realized its dream of obtaining functioning nuclear weapons — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote:

As long as Kim Jong Il was in power, I thought we had little prospect of inducing his regime to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Every day Kim and his officials focused on ways to consolidate and protect their dictatorship. Their disastrous policies spawned famine, torture, and oppression. The inhumane leadership of North Korea seemed to believe that the surest hold on power was the pursuit of weapons programs.

North Korea has long isolated itself from nearly every nation on earth. Its original allies — the USSR and Mao’s PRC — developed in ways which drew them away from the DPRK. The Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, abandoning its doctrinaire Marxist ideology. China tweaked its definition of communism in ways which made it less similar to North Korea. So the DPRK has no true allies. But it does retain at least working relationship with China.

So it is that diplomats from around the world look to China to communicate with North Korea. The global community hopes that China will be able to at least persuade the Kim dynasty to see reality. It is probable that the Chinese hierarchy sees the DPRK as a problem, and sees the leadership of the DPRK as unrealistic. Certainly, it would make life easier for China if the North Koreans were at least a bit rational.

At the same time, however, China does not want to be triangulated into the role of being the spokesman for the world community. China will not simply present the world’s demands to North Korea, and thereby become simply a messenger. So this is the tension: China wants the DPRK to improve its behavior, but it does not want to be seen as falling in line with the consensus of the globe’s nations, as Don Rumsfeld writes:

I thought it worthwhile to try to get China to work diplomatically to persuade North Korea to change its nuclear weapons policy, based on the view that our countries had a shared interest in keeping the Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, China seemed more interested in blocking U.S. efforts against North Korea than in keeping the Korean peninsula nuclear weapons-free. The outcome the Chinese seemed to fear most was a collapse of their neighbor. Then they would be forced to deal with refugees and a failed Korean state on their border. As long as Kim Jong Il had China as a patron of sorts, I was not optimistic that negotiations with North Korea involving the Chinese, known as the six-party talks, would succeed.

So, during the first decade of the new millennium, the team which hoped to confront and reform the DPRK — the team which included the UN, NATO, SEATO, the G7, the G20, the Six Party Talks, and others — did not always receive much help from China.

Regarding China’s stance, Don Rumsfeld wrote:

China may one day regret its position if Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan decides to pursue nuclear weapons to counter the North Korean threat.

Moving from the first decade of the new millennium to the second decade of the new millennium, the global community adjusted its approach to the DPRK. Where words had failed, actions would have an impact.

But the perennial question facing the diplomat is this: If one seeks to employ actions instead of words, how does one avoid war? How do the agreed nations of the world take action against North Korea without starting a war?

Nikki Haley was the United States ambassador to the United Nations from January 2017 to December 2018. She was one of the leaders who helped to implement a new approach by the UN and the US:

The new policy came to be called the “maximum pressure” campaign. Part of the new policy was military preparedness. Although we were committed to finding a diplomatic solution, the president never took the possibility of military action off the table. We would deliver a devastating blow if North Korea used its missiles against the United States or our allies. And we made sure the North Koreans knew it.

The “maximum pressure” strategy included both military strength and economic leverage. A concerted enforcement of economic sanctions denied large amounts of income which North Korea would have otherwise received from its export of goods. The two factors — economic pressure and military muscle-flexing — did not replace, but rather joined, the diplomacy of the previous decades, as Nikki Haley writes:

We also exerted pressure through diplomacy, encouraging other nations to cut off political and trade ties with North Korea.

The new tactics had measurable effects: the number and frequency of nuclear weapons explosions and missile launches in North Korea declined detectably from 2017 to 2020.

North Korea and the United States held their first-ever summit-level talks, when Kim Jong-un met with President Trump on 12 June 2018 in Singapore. This was followed by two more summit meetings, in Hanoi in February 2019, and in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North Korea and South Korea on 30 June 2019.

Starting in early 2021, this trend reversed itself, and North Korea began increasing its dramatic public displays by detonating nuclear weapons and launching missiles.

Thursday, July 14, 2022

Negotiating with North Korea: Words Are Never Enough

Since its inception — or, rather, because of the nature of its inception — North Korea has been seen both as a danger and as a violation of human rights by the nations of the world. All major global gatherings — the UN, NATO, SEATO, the G7, the G20, etc. — have not only issued statements condemning North Korea’s behavior, but also have undertaken economic sanctions as an effort to persuade North Korea to respect human dignity and to desist from belligerent actions.

North Korea was organized in 1945 as a Stalinist satellite state, an extension of the USSR, under the rule of dictator Kim Il-sung, chosen by the Soviets to run the puppet state for them. It formally became the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948.

The DPRK represented the harshest form of Stalinism, and maintained this posture after the death of Stalin in 1953, and after the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. Identified as one of the most repressive regimes on earth, North Korea routinely arrests, beats, tortures, imprisons, and executes its citizens for the slightest offenses. People have been sentenced to decades in prison for merely possessing a Bible. Women have been forced into slavery.

The militaristic nature of the DPRK led to the surprise attack in 1950 on South Korea. The resulting Korean War caused the deaths of millions, and was a direct consequence of the actions of the Kim Il-sung regime. In 1994, he died, and his son Kim Jong-il inherited the role of dictator.

During the reign of Kim Jong-il, North Korea energetically pursued the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons and the missiles needed to deliver them to nations around the world. The DPRK wanted not only to bully South Korea, but rather also to bully any country on the globe.

The intelligence agencies of various nations soon discovered North Korea’s atomic weapons program. Diplomats used both the carrot — promised rewards for desisting from weapons development — and the stick — promised economic punishments for continued construction of nuclear weapons. Neither approach succeeded.

Eventually, the DPRK revealed its new weapons to the world. While the exact timing was a surprise, North Korea’s acquisition of atomic weapons had been an inevitability for some years.

One reason for the date of unveiling of the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities was the fact that the world’s attention had been elsewhere. Problems in Iraq and Syria dominated both diplomatic talk and the news media. Like his father and his son, Kim Jong-il didn’t like it when he wasn’t on the front pages of the world’s newspapers. At atomic explosion would quickly fix that.

In October 2006, Vice President Richard Cheney — better known as Dick Cheney — learned of North Korea’s surprise. He recalls:

In the fall of 2006, as violence in Iraq was still escalating, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test, setting off an explosion at the Punggye test site some two hundred forty miles northeast of Pyongyang. When the blast was detected, it was Sunday evening, October 8, in Washington, D.C. The next morning President Bush went before the cameras in the Diplomatic Reception Room to condemn the test and issue a warning.

An atomic weapon “test” is not actually testing anything: the scientists know how it will work. It is a gesture designed to intimidate other nations.

President George W. Bush perceived that the DPRK posed two problems. First, its own nuclear arsenal. Second, its ability to sell nuclear weapons to rogue states and to terrorist groups. During a televised address, he said:

The North Korean regime remains one of the world’s leading proliferators of missile technology, including transfers to Iran and Syria. The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences of such action.

Bush’s concerns were justified. The DPRK wasted little time before it began selling nuclear technology to bad actors. Dick Cheney writes:

Six months later we received intelligence that a threat of this nature had materialized. I learned about it in detail one afternoon in mid-April 2007, in National Security Advisor Steve Hadley’s office. I was seated in one of Steve’s large blue wing chairs and he was to my left. Two Israeli officials were on the sofa to my right. Meir Dagan, director of Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, pulled materials from his briefcase and spread them on the coffee table in front of us. For the next hour, Dagan showed us photos of a building in the Syrian desert at a place called al-Kibar. It was a nuclear test reactor.

Intelligence agencies were able to confirm that both supplies and expertise from North Korea were being used to start a nuclear weapons program in Syria. In September 2007, the Isreali military destroyed the site.

That was a significant setback to the Syrian atomic weapons program; indeed, possibly the end of that program. The site, also known as Dair Alzour, was investigated by United Nations officials, who confirmed the nature and purpose of the site.

While the Syrian threat was neutralized, the North Korean threat grew.

A decade later, the situation had not changed substantially. North Korea was still belligerent, threatening other nations. Its nuclear arsenal was larger, and it had developed missiles capable of traveling greater distances. In 2011, Kim Jong-un had become the dictator upon the death of his father, Kim Jong-il.

The world’s diplomats had shown that diplomacy would not affect the DPRK. Spoken and written words were largely meaningless coming from the North Koreans or going to them. The DPRK would agree to any terms and sign any agreement, even as it was violating the treaty it was signing.

An effective policy toward North Korea would consist of actions, not words.

In January 2017, Nikki Haley became the United States Ambassador to the United Nations. She recalls her assessment of the North Korean situation at that time:

The Trump administration’s approach to North Korea, more than any other country except Iran, represented a fundamental break from the past. For over twenty years, both Republican and Democratic presidents had tried various strategies to stop the regime’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. These strategies consisted mostly of trying to bribe Pyongyang into good behavior. What was worse, these bribes were not conditional. North Korea had to do nothing but promise to change its behavior in order to receive aid from the United States. Only after the regime had gotten what it wanted did the United States realize that their promises would not be kept.

As ambassador, Nikki Haley helped to enact economic measures against North Korea. Various nations, by refusing to accept goods exported from the DPRK, reduced North Korea’s import income by more than $1 billion dollars.

She also helped to coordinate a diplomatic framework allowing joint operations by the militaries of various nations. These operations were a show of force in direct response to DPRK missile launches.

Nikki Haley’s actions were part of the new approach to North Korea. Substantive actions made more of an impression on Kim Jong-un than diplomatic verbiage. She writes:

The Trump administration took a fundamentally different approach. The policy of “strategic patience” proclaimed by President Obama was over. We would no longer rely on a policy of appeasement to try to persuade the Kim regime to give up its nuclear program. U.S. presidents had been kicking the can down the road on North Korea for years. There was no longer any road to kick the can down.

When it became clear to Kim Jong-un that his actions would have consequences, and that those consequences would be more than mere words, he became amenable to change. Some historians mark 12 June 2018 as a turning point: on that date, the first meeting between Kim Jong-un and President Trump resulted in a significant decline in the number of missile tests conducted by the DPRK.

The Singapore summit was the first ever meeting between a U.S. president and a North Korean leader.

Kim Jong-un was convinced that, in contrast to the previous decades, there would now be advantages for the DPRK if it behaved more peacefully. Two more summit meetings followed, one in Hanoi in February 2019 and one on 30 June 2019 on the border between South Korea and North Korea.

North Korea is still a problem. Kim Jong-un is still a problem. But it has been shown that progress can be made if specific concrete actions are taken. In diplomatic relations with the DPRK, words alone will never be enough.

Saturday, July 9, 2022

The Limits of Diplomacy: North Korea’s Disregard for Words

North Korea has been a constant concern for diplomats around the world almost from the very moment that the nation came into being in 1945. It was created by the Soviet Union, and was originally the northern part of the People’s Republic of Korea, a short-lived entity. It officially became the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948. The Soviets were the sustaining economic factor in the founding of the nation and during the DPRK’s first years were the ultimate authority behind North Korean policies.

It was Joseph Stalin who authorized a request from Kim Il-sung to launch a surprise attack on South Korea in 1950. The North’s invasion of the South was the beginning of the Korean War. The DPRK’s belligerence has been constant since that time: although actual combat ceased in 1953, the North’s continual weapons buildup and militaristic rhetoric have left the nations of eastern Asia constantly wary.

Ironically, as the Soviet Union experienced occasional periods of relaxation in the post-Stalin era, including the rapprochement of detente in the 1970s and the perestroika and glasnost of Gorbachev in the 1980s, the DPRK became ever more harsh in its Stalinist tendencies.

The global diplomatic community, in the forms of SEATO, the UN, and NATO, have worked continuously to persuade North Korea to remain peaceful. Condoleezza Rice, who was at the time National Security Advisor, describes a moment in 2002 when it became clear that the efforts of various nations were not successful and that the DPRK was building a nuclear weapons program.

Colin Powell, who was at that time Secretary of State, had been working on a new version of a diplomatic strategy to pacify North Korea. But it was clear that the regime in Pyongyang, the DPRK’s capital, was unimpressed by anything which diplomacy might offer. There was no possibility of diplomacy persuading North Korea to move in the direction of peace.

On the contrary, the DPRK had formed a relationship with Abdul Qadeer Khan. Khan’s speciality was helping nations build nuclear weapons. He worked primarily with Islamic nations, but was willing to work with the Kim dynasty as well. Khan was the favored source by both Muslim dictatorships and North Korea. His professional goal was to spread weapons of mass destruction among nations who opposed democracy and liberty.

Condoleezza Rice recalls a moment in 2002 when it was clear that the DPRK was simply ignoring all diplomatic efforts and proceeding to build atomic weapons:

Colin advocated a bold approach, as he called it, prescribing engagement through a series of step-by-step moves by each side. His hope was that they’d lead to a different (if somewhat vague) new relationship between the United States and North Korea. Then, as the preparations were under way, a bombshell dropped from the intelligence community. Incomplete but troubling reports linking North Korea to the A.Q. Khan network had emerged. Moreover, Pyongyang had been suspected of seeking the components for uranium enrichment around the globe. Very close to the first anniversary of September 11, John McLaughlin, the deputy director of the CIA, reported the Agency’s assessment that North Korea had built a “production-scale” facility for uranium enrichment. Whatever the status of the Agreed Framework in slowing the plutonium program, the North appeared to be pursuing a second means of obtaining a nuclear weapon.

Diplomacy amounts to words — spoken words or written words — and diplomacy has achieved great things for the cause of peace. But in order for “the pen to be mightier than the sword,” in the famous words of Edward Bulwer-Lytton, at least a modicum of sincerity must be present on both sides of the negotiating table. North Korea is utterly cynical, and willing to say anything, sign anything, and agree to anything — and then do the very opposite.

In 2006, the DPRK revealed that it had successfully constructed nuclear weapons. In the following decade, it developed more and stronger weapons, as well as increasingly sophisticated long-range missiles capable of delivering those weapons to distant countries.

By 2017, the DPRK had built a substantial arsenal. Nikki Haley, who was U.S. ambassador to the United Nations at the time, writes:

In November, the North Korean regime launched an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting anywhere in the United States. With that, the Kim regime declared itself a nuclear power.

Kim Jong-un, who was now the leader of North Korea, and who had inherited power from his father, Kim Jong-il, and from his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, was in a position to threaten major nations.

Speaking with the North Koreans was useless. Signing treaties and agreements with them was useless. Words were meaningless. The other nations had to flex their military muscles in order to get the DPRK’s attention: Japan began increasing its military program and South Korea began to orchestrate military maneuvers as a public display of its ability to retaliate for any sneak attack by the North.

Ambassador Nikki Haley explains:

The North Koreans had openly stated that their missiles were intended to deliver nuclear weapons to strike cities in the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Now they unquestionably had the capacity to do so. It was as dangerous a situation as the United States had encountered in years. The air in Washington and New York was full of a constant, unsettling fear — that we were only one provocation away from a terrible conflict.

Together with Japan and South Korea, the United States demonstrated military preparedness. It showed that it was capable of returning maximum retaliation after any surprise attack by North Korea.

During the next few years after 2017, the DPRK did indeed reduce its threats to nearby nations — threats which were often delivered in the form of missile “tests.” These tests were not really tests — they were displays of power: a form of bullying.

But the reduction in the number of tests was mere cover. Secretly, North Korea continued to build more weapons.

North Korea has no allies, but it has at least a working relationship with China, more so than it has with any other nation. Even China, however, found it wise to put significant economic pressure on the DPRK.

The lesson is this: other nations must apply economic pressure and display military strength in order to obtain a meaningful change in the behavior of North Korea.

Wednesday, June 29, 2022

Greek Success and Greek Failure: How the Once-Mighty Greek Economy Fell

For several decades, observers have become accustomed to thinking of Greece as an economic catastrophe. The euro crisis, which started in 2009, highlighted this fact, but Greece’s economic stagnation had existed before that.

Because Greece has had this bad reputation since before the start of the new millennium, it can be difficult to recall that there was a time when the Greek economy was working well, as historian Aristides Hatzis writes:

Greece used to be considered something of a success story. One could even argue that Greece was a major success story for several decades. Greece’s average rate of growth for half a century (1929-1980) was 5.2 percent; during the same period Japan grew at only 4.9 percent.

The prosperity during those years is even more significant if one recalls that the time segment in question includes WW2 and several domestic power struggles among Greek politicians.

What were the causes of Greek prosperity? The fact that few industries were owned or operated by the government; a low national debt; government spending was a small percentage of GDP; and a low level of business regulation.

These principles led Greece into economic success.

Greece’s decline began with the reversal of these principles.

The Greek government took ownership of various businesses; borrowed large amounts of money; spend a large percentage of GDP; and regulated industries and financial transactions.

The history of Greece took an about-face in a distinct manner. Nearly every policy trend was turned into its opposite, as Aristides Hatzis explains:

Modern Greece has become a symbol of economic and political bankruptcy, a natural experiment in institutional failure. It’s not easy for a single country to serve as a textbook example of so many institutional deficiencies, rigidities, and distortions, yet the Greek government has managed it. The case of Greece is a precautionary tale for all others.

Greece was once welcomed happily into the European Union — or the “European Community” as it was called back then. But by the first decade of the new millennium, the EU saw Greece primarily as a problem to be solved: a problem which was the result of government intervention which greatly harmed the freedom of the marketplace.

Tuesday, June 28, 2022

The Italian Economic Miracle: Luigi Einaudi

The amazing recovery, reconstruction, and rebirth of Italy after 1945 shows both the flourishing of a free-market economy and the expansion of human rights and civil liberties. These two facets of postwar Italy are related: indeed, they are inseparable.

Italy had suffered for more than twenty years under Mussolini’s Fascism, which inflicted high rates of taxation, wage and price controls, and government-owned industries upon the people. These Fascist economic policies crushed any hopes for a democratic society, or for the free expression and discussion of opinions and ideas.

After the war, and after the fall of Mussolini and his Fascism, Italians worked toward having a truly democratic society. The instrument they would use to build this society was the free market.

The Fascists had imposed a sort of ‘crony capitalism’ or ‘state capitalism’ which was a ‘planned economy’ or a ‘command economy.’ To undo the harm caused by Fascism, a different direction was needed: a laissez-faire economy, in which the government didn’t intervene to control wages or prices, in which tax rates were kept low, and in which the government didn’t own a significant percentage of the means of production.

An economist named Luigi Einaudi was a leader in the restoration of Italy as a free society. Under his leadership, Mussolini’s high Fascist tax rates were reduced, Keynesian economics were rejected, and public expenditures as a percent of GDP shrank. The lira, which was a sad joke on the international currency markets of the 1970s and 1980s, was valued and reliable during the 1950s and 1960s.

From approximately 1945 to 1965, Italy enjoyed a social and economic renaissance, much of it due to the leadership of Luigi Einaudi, as historian Piercamillo Falasca writes:

Luigi Einaudi’s influence was crucially important. A careful monetary policy curbed inflation for at least twenty years (in 1959 the Financial Times celebrated the lira as the most stable Western currency); free-trade agreements helped Italy to re-enter the international market; a fiscal reform (the Vanoni Act, named for the minister who designed it) cut tax rates and simplified the tax collection system. In an era dominated by Keynesian ideas and easy spending, Italian public expenditure remained relatively controlled: in 1960 public expenditure barely reached the level of 1937 (30 percent of GDP, with a significant share of fixed-capital investments), whereas in other European countries it had risen dramatically.

The deep philosophical underpinning of Einaudi’s thought rested, in part, on his view of human nature. This is true of any political, social, or economic system: whatever one believes about human nature will dictate how one attempts best to structure communal life.

Long before Einaudi, thinkers like Adam Smith had explored various differing archetypes like ‘the prudent man,’ ‘the self-made man,’ or ‘the good family father.’ Einaudi ruminated on these and other paradigms, as historian Alberto Giordano writes:

Einaudi very often stressed the importance of another model, the independent entrepreneur who, at his own risk and following the intuition of his genius, opens new roads for himself and for mankind. We cannot explain, Einaudi writes many times, the legitimacy of profits and the very idea of progress — though moral, political or merely economic — without relying on this peculiar character.

These different personalities can interact with each other in a market economy. If they have more freedom to negotiate and voluntarily settle with each other, then not only will prosperity increase for all parties, but a more democratic society will result.

The amazing postwar recovery of Italian society and the Italian economy reveals the conjunction of free societies with free markets: democracy and civil liberties thrive in a laissez-faire environment.

Monday, June 27, 2022

Reviving Italy: A Nation Emerges after Suffering under Fascist Domination

In late 1943, the King of Italy led a movement to free Italy from the oppression of Benito Mussolini and his Fascist Party. Mussolini was imprisoned, and the King surrendered to the Allies and declared war on Germany. At that time, however, only the southern part of Italy was under the control of the Italian government. The northern part was controlled by the Nazis, who helped Mussolini escape from his prison in South and find refuge in the North.

The Italians had to fight alongside the Allies to liberate the northern part of their own country. By early 1945, the war in Italy was over, Mussolini was dead, and King Victor Emmanuel III began the process of transforming Italy into a free society. Along the way, the monarchy would be turned into a republic in 1946.

The leaders of the new Italy faced a difficult task. How does one lead a nation back to liberty after years of tyranny? It was a complicated process, with many decisions to be made along the way. One principle was clear: the virtuous cycle in which democracy and economic deregulation encourage each other, as historian Piercamillo Falasca writes:

In the very first years after the Second World War, a group of liberal market-oriented economists and politicians attained key positions in government, swept away Fascist legislation, and instituted democratic politics and free-market reforms. A central figure was the anti-Fascist journalist and economist Luigi Einaudi, one of the most prominent Italian classical liberals, who returned to Italy and served after the war as Governor of the Central Bank, then Minister of Finance, and finally President of the Republic; he greatly influenced the economic policies implemented by Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi (1945-1953) and, after De Gasperi’s death, by his successor Giuseppe Pella, and others.

Italy had suffered in multiple ways: The physical destruction of war, the economic devastation of Fascism’s high tax rates, and the social restrictions imposed by Mussolini’s ideology. The Fascists had driven public expenditures up significantly, to over 30% of GDP.

Fascism’s destructive effects on the Italian economy included wage and price controls as well as the nationalization of various industries.

The postwar task was to somehow rebuild Italian society and the Italian economy, as well as the nation’s physical infrastructure. The economists and government officials of the immediate postwar years were brilliant thinkers, but they remain relatively obscure figures, not often mentioned in history books, as Piercamillo Falasca writes:

Some of those figures may not be well known outside of Italy, but they represented an extraordinary “exception” for European political culture. After twenty years of Mussolini’s Fascist regime and the horrors of war, that group of classical liberals represented the only hope for the nation to emerge from its totalitarian past into democratic capitalist freedom. The context they operated in could hardly be considered an easy one. Italy was a poor country that had been devastated by Fascist collectivism and war; most of the population was both unemployed and uneducated; infrastructure was absent or very poor; a powerful Communist Party threatened to replace Fascist collectivism with Communist collectivism; and state-controlled companies dominated much of the economy.

A “democratic capitalist” approach was the truly free market which would restore a sense of human rights and civil liberties to Italy. This stood in sharp contrast to the ‘crony capitalism’ or ‘state capitalism’ which was the ‘planned economy’ or ‘command economy’ of Mussolini’s Fascism.

The approach known as ‘classical liberalism’ allowed Italy to become a free society, in which political beliefs and opinions of all types could be freely discussed and debated. It is the mechanism of the free market economy which enables a truly democratic society.

Sunday, June 26, 2022

The Mayerling Incident: Personal Scandal, Geopolitical Effects

For most of the nineteenth century, Europe was organized by the so-called ‘Metternich System’ — a series of diplomatic arrangements worked out at the Congress of Vienna. This configuration kept the peace for a century: Between 1815 and 1914, there were only a few micro-wars among the European nations, small both in temporal duration and in number of casualties.

The Congress of Vienna was a conference, lasting from September 1814 to June 1815, in which a large number of diplomats from various European nations met to create some sense of peace and stability in the wake of twenty-five-year-long streak of violence: the ten years (1789 to 1799) of the French Revolution and the fifteen years (1800 to 1815) of Napoleon’s reign. Tired of war and bloodshed, Europe wanted peace.

Klemens von Metternich was a German-born diplomat working for the Austrians. He organized the conference. The main principle was that there should be five roughly equal superpowers in Europe: the UK, France, Prussia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Russia. Matched in political, economic, and military strength, the five-way division of power should prevent any one nation from going on a rampage.

Each of the five superpowers was ruled by a dynasty, a royal family: in Prussia, the Hohenzollerns; in Austria-Hungary, the Habsburgs; in France, the Bourbons; in the UK, the House of Hanover; in Russia, the House of Romanov.

In a system of hereditary monarchies, marriages and the births of children were political events as much as, and sometimes more than, personal events. Unlike the common people, the royals were not always free to marry for love. Arranged marriages were not unusual.

So it was that Crown Prince Rudolf married Princess Stephanie of Belgium in 1881. Rudolf was the only son and heir apparent of Emperor Franz-Josef of Austria-Hungary. Rudolf had little interest in Stephanie, but the marriage was intended to improve relationships between Belgium and Austria-Hungary. Whatever affection Rudolf might have had quickly faded. He began to have a series of affairs. Disappointed with his life, he consumed large amounts of alcohol, cocaine, morphine, and opium. His life spiraled downwards in personal disintegration.

While Rudolf’s private life was a trainwreck, his political life was more productive. He was intelligent and well-educated, writing and reading several different languages. He was well-versed in philosophy and economics, authoring books, articles, and pamphlets. He worked with Carl Menger, an influential economist of the era, and envisioned a useful and productive role for the aristocracy in modern Europe.

In January 1889, Rudolf attended a celebration at the German Embassy in Vienna. It was the thirtieth birthday of Kaiser Wilhelm, the reigning monarch of Prussia. Both Rudolf’s wife and his current mistress were in attendance. This was the last time that he was seen in public, as historian Angus Robertson writes:

The day after leaving the German Embassy reception, Rudolf was driven through a snowstorm toward his hunting lodge at Mayerling in the Vienna woods. Collecting young Mary at a prearranged stop on the way, they arrived without anyone at the lodge noticing the presence of the young lover. When nobody answered from his locked bedroom on the morning of 30 January 1889, the door was forced open by Count Josephy Hoyos, the crown prince’s hunting companion. He found Rudolf and young Mary dead both with gunshot wounds to the head, suggesting a murder-suicide by Rudolf. Count Hoyos raced toward the Mayerling railway station to try to stop the Vienna-bound morning express train, so he could get to the capital quickly and tell the emperor. A telegraph to the Vienna owners of the railway line, explaining why the express had been stopped, arrived quicker than Count Hoyos, and Baron Albert Rothschild reported the shocking news to the German and British Embassies: ‘Diplomatic Vienna thus learned of Rudolf’s suicide before the emperor did.’

The deaths of Rudolf and Mary were personal tragedies, but they were also political shocks: diplomats around the world had reckoned Rudolf to be the successor to Franz-Josef. Each nation had to make projections about its foreign policy going forward: international relations would have to be revised.

Now Archduke Karl Ludwig would be the heir presumptive, and for all practical purposes the heir apparent. This news caused governmental recalculations around the globe, as Angus Robertson reports:

German ambassador Prince Reuss immediately broke the word to embassy counsellor Count Anton Monts, while at the British residence on the other side of Metternichgasse the door was ‘burst open’ by Baron Rothschild, in evening clothes with all his Orders on, who said: ‘I have come to tell you a very sad thing, the Crown Prince is dead!’

The death of Crown Prince Rudolf had a significant effect on the international scene. Details about the two deaths — was it a double suicide as the evidence at first suggested, or was there another, deeper, narrative being hidden? — would simultaneously be clues about the inner workings of the Habsburg administration. Angus Robertson continues:

Given that Rudolf was the heir to the imperial throne, the tragedy was doubly shocking; how did it come to this and what did it mean for the future of the monarchy? It led to huge interest in the capitals of the world. ‘Ambassadors in Vienna poked and pried, wrote home reams of hearsay and rumor. Queen Victoria implored her minister in Vienna, “Pray give all the details you can gather, however distressing they may be.” The papal nuncio, on the excuse of praying on the death scene, got admittance to the Mayerling lodge and nosed about for a morsel of truth.

Some observers conjectured that Rudolf had conducted secret talks with certain Hungarian factions, and that he chose suicide over the disclosure of those talks. Speculation is available in far greater quantities than information.

Karl Ludwig didn’t last long in the role of heir. He died in 1896. The new heir was Archduke Franz-Ferdinand, who was assassinated in 1914.

Crown Prince Rudolf, had he lived, would have spent twenty-five years as heir, and during those years, would have exerted influence on Franz-Josef and the operations of the Habsburg administration. In personality and temperament, Rudolf was different from Franz-Ferdinand.

Historians are left with a hypothetical question which, of course, can never be answered: had Rudolf lived, which impact might he have had on the global diplomatic scene? Had Rudolf lived, might World War One have been avoided?