Meanwhile, other parts of the empire began to break away from central control. In Egypt, the ambitious governor Muhammad Ali declared the region's autonomy from Ottoman rule and initiated a series of reforms designed to promote economic growth and government efficiency. During the 1830s, he sought to improve agricultural production and reform the educational system, and he imported machinery and technicians from Europe to carry out the first industrial revolution on African soil. In the end, however, the effort failed, partly because Egypt's manufactures could not compete with those of Europe and also because much of the profit from the export of cash crops went into the hands of
landlords who were inexperienced at exporting such cash crops, and who were more interested in ensuring a continued lack of social mobility - keeping Egyptian peasants locked into the strict Muslim class structure which had dominated the region for centuries. These landlords were wealthy and would continue to be wealthy, whether or not the export business was successful. The ones harmed by the failure of export businesses were the peasant class, who stood to experience a modest gain in income, and the middle class, which was tiny but might have enlarged had the exporting been successful.
Egypt's first pass at modernizing - and the results of this attempt - are telling and predicative. Industrialization in any culture is a traumatic process: in England, Europe, and America, it caused urban misery until an economic equilibrium was reached in which child labor, long hours, and low wages were eliminated. But in a post-colonial Islamic nation like Egypt, industrialization goes past "traumatic" and into "utterly destructive" conditions - on top of which, it is doomed to fail. Industrialization was predestined to come to naught in Egypt because the rationalization of processes rests upon a world-view fostered by the calm logic of medieval Scholasticism, and upon the children of Scholasticism: physics, mathematics, and chemistry. Egypt's Muslim population - from peasants to aristocrats - had a worldview which didn't intuitively mesh with the rationalization of processes and industrial engineering management.
The Suez Canal is an example. Duiker writes:
Ever since the voyages of the Portuguese explorers at the close of the fifteenth century, European trade with the East had been carried on almost exclusively by the route around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa. But from the outset, there was some interest in shortening the route by digging a canal east of Cairo, where only a low, swampy isthmus separated the Mediterranean from the Red Sea.
The land route between Europe and the East, which had been the original trade route before the Portuguese discovered the sea route, had become too dangerous, as the caravans traveling in both directions were attacked by raiders. One of those raiders was in fact Muhammad, the founder of Islam. His early source of income had been raiding the caravans traveling the region of Mecca and Medina. Trade between Europe and the Far East declined and languished for several centuries, only to flourish again when the Portuguese route was discovered.
The Ottoman Turks, who controlled the area, had considered constructing a canal in the sixteenth century, but nothing was accomplished until 1854, when the French entrepreneur Ferdinand de Lesseps signed a contract to begin construction of the canal. The completed project brought little immediate benefit to Egypt, however, which under the vigorous rule of the Ottoman official Muhammad Ali was attempting to adopt reforms on the European model. The cost of construction imposed a major debt on the Egyptian government and forced a growing level of dependence on foreign financial support. When an army revolt against the increasing foreign influence broke out in 1881, the British stepped in to protect their investment (they had bought Egypt's canal company shares in 1875) and set up an informal protectorate that would last until World War I.
Sadly, Egypt's story is one of financial opportunities gone bad. Although Muslim raiders succeeded in scaring away European traders who wanted to go through the Middle East to get to the Far East, it was a Pyrrhic victory - they "succeeded" in losing a tremendous economic opportunity: if European traders had continued using the land route to the Far East during the early Middle Ages, the countries of the Middle East could have managed this trade for a permanent continuous revenue stream. Trade using the Portuguese route around the southern tip of Africa represented lost opportunities for the Middle East. The Suez Canal was a chance to get back into that game: building, owning, and operating that canal guaranteed steady income. The Portuguese route was no longer the best path - now most shipping would once again go through the Middle East. But why was Egypt unable to operate the canal at a profit, when the French and the British were able to do so? What is it about the culture of Middle East which prevented this success? We cannot blame Arab culture, because the Arabs have been successful businessmen over the centuries. After the rise of Islam, Arabs continued to be astute traders, but it is important to note that not all Arabs became Muslims. The skills required to be a successful trader are different than the skills required to run a corporate operation like the Suez Canal. Although Egypt lost its financial opportunity in the Suez Canal, it would regain its political independence.
National consciousness had existed in Egypt since well before the colonial takeover, and members of the legislative council were calling for independence even before World War I. In 1918, a formal political party called the Wafd was formed to promote Egyptian independence. The intellectuals were opposed as much to the local palace government as to the British, however, and in 1952, an army coup overthrew King Farouk, the grandson of Khedive Ismail, and established an independent republic.
Khedive Ismail ruled Egypt from 1863 to 1879, and King Farouk ruled from 1936 to 1952. Having gained independence from the British, Egypt spent approximately thirty years under a monarchy. Ethnically speaking, Egypt is not a strictly Arab society.
Technically, Egypt was not an Arab state. King Farouk, who had acceded to power in 1936, had frequently declared support for the Arab cause, but the Egyptian people were not Bedouins and shared little of the culture of the peoples across the Red Sea. Nevertheless, Farouk committed Egyptian armies to the disastrous war against Israel.
In the late 1940's and early 1950's, Farouk symbolized the fence-riding character of Egypt's role in the Middle East. Not truly Arab, but often engaged in Arab causes, the Islamic identity of a vocal political faction inside Egypt would sometimes be decisive, or sometimes be overruled by other Egyptians.
In 1952, King Farouk, whose corrupt habits had severely eroded his early popularity, was overthrown by a military coup engineered by young military officers ostensibly under the leadership of Colonel Muhammad Nagib. The real force behind the scenes was Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser (1918 - 1970), the son of a minor government functionary who, like many of his fellow officers, had been angered by the army's inadequate preparation for the war against Israel four years earlier. In 1952, the monarchy was replaced by a republic.
Under Nasser, and later under Anwar Sadat, Egypt seemed to have a chance to exploit its economic opportunities in a meaningful way - a chance to assume its place at the table of modern, economically significant, nations.
In 1954, Nasser seized power in his own right, and immediately instituted a land reform program. He also adopted a policy of neutrality in foreign affairs and expressed sympathy for the Arab cause. The British presence had rankled many Egyptians for years, for even after granting Egypt independence, Britain had retained control over the Suez Canal to protect its route to the Indian Ocean. In 1956, Nasser suddenly nationalized the Suez Canal Company, which had been under British and French administration. Seeing a threat to their route to the Indian Ocean, the British and the French launched a joint attack on Egypt to protect their investment. They were joined by Israel, whose leaders had grown exasperated at sporadic Arab commando raids on Israeli territory and now decided to strike back. But the Eisenhower administration in the United States, concerned that the attack smacked of a revival of colonialism, supported Nasser and brought about the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt and of Israeli troops from the Sinai peninsula.
Nasser's next project was to form a United Arab Republic; the first step was to unite Syria and Egypt in 1958. He hoped to include, eventually, all the other Arab nations, but he was unsuccessful in persuading them to join. The kings of Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia saw that this was a socialist plan to take money away from their kingdoms. Eventually, even the union between Egypt and Syria failed, in 1961. Nasser's political vision continued along the Pan-Arab line: to create political ties between Arab nations. This led to Egypt's close ties to Yemen and Algeria, to Egypt coordinating the anti-Israel activities of the Arab nations, and to Egypt's support for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
Nasser was, however, humiliated when Israel gained territory in the Six-Day-War of 1967. He died in office in 1970, and was replaced by Anwar Sadat. Nasser's
socialist approach has had little success, and most governments, including those of Egypt and Syria, eventually shifted to a more free enterprise approach while encouraging foreign investment to compensate for a lack of capital or technology.
The chimera of socialist economics disappointed Egypt. Cultural problems accompanied economic problems.
In 1928, devout Muslims in Egypt formed the Muslim Brotherhood as a means of promoting personal piety. Later, the movement began to take a more activist approach, including the eventual use of terrorism by a radical minority. Despite Nasser's surface commitment to Islamic ideals and Arab unity, some Egyptians were fiercely opposed to his policies and regard his vision of Arab socialism as a betrayal of Islamic principles. Nasser reacted harshly and executed a number of his leading opponents.
By this point, it was becoming clear that peace and progress were permanently impossible for some segments of the Middle East. Although the millions of ordinary people who live there certainly desire both, a variety of cultural or social factors prevent both peace and certain forms of political and economic progress. Whether leaders are sincere or corrupt, Egypt - and one may generalize to a number of other nations in the Middle East - seems to swing back and forth between ruthless secularist dictators and harsh Islamist theocracies. Neither provides a particularly kind environment. Following Nasser's sudden and unexpected death in office, Anwar Sadat became Egypt's next leader.
Sadat soon showed himself to be more pragmatic than his predecessor, dropping the now irrelevant name of United Arab Republic in favor of the Arab Republic of Egypt and replacing Nasser's socialist policies with a new strategy based on free enterprise and encouragement of Western investment. He also agreed to sign a peace treaty with Israel on the condition that Israel retire to its pre-1967 frontiers. Concerned that other Arab countries would refuse to make peace and take advantage of its presumed weakness, Israel refused.
In 1973, the Yom Kippur War took place, as Egypt and Syrian forces attacked Israel. The results were inconclusive. A cease-fire was reached, and Henry Kissinger maintained a fragile peace for the next several years by means of his diplomacy. In 1978, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Sadat signed the Camp David Agreement, which provided a constructive peace for several years. This diplomacy ended, however, by
the assassination of Sadat by Islamic militants in October 1981. But there were deeper causes, including the continued unwillingness of Muslim governments to recognize Israel.
After Sadat's death, Hosni Mubarak became president. Mubarak was president of Egypt for a total of twenty-nine consecutive years. He was overthrown in 2011; the revolutionaries pointed to corruption in government, lack of free speech, police brutality, less than free elections, and economic unpleasantness. Although these serious charges did, indeed, have some truth to them, Mubarek also had some positive features: he had maintained a peace, or at least a ceasefire, with Israel for many years, and had created good trading relations with a number of other nations. The revolutionaries of 2011 took a calculated risk: they got rid of Mubarek without knowing exactly what type of government they would get next. Historian Michael Savage writes that
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak had long been a U.S. ally and had kept the radical Muslim Brotherhood out of power for more than 40 years prior to Obama's intervention. The president suddenly insisted at the beginning of February 2011 that a transition to a democratic government in Egypt "must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now."
Historians note that Mubarak had good, or at least tolerable, diplomatic relations with a variety of nations, and with U.S. presidents Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and Bush - and even with Obama's first two years in office. What changed, that suddenly Mubarak's removal from office was a demand? Mubarak had acted in the interests of Europe and America - and in his own interests, to be sure - in keeping the Muslim Brotherhood out of power: the Muslim Brotherhood, which represents not the peaceful moderate Muslims, but rather the violent extremists; the Muslim Brotherhood which does not merely have links to terrorist organizations, but which rather explicitly encourages and supports them; the Muslim Brotherhood which takes, not a nominal interpretation of Islam which is conducive to nonviolent coexistence, but rather the most orthodox and literal interpretation of the Qur'an demanding aggression. Hosni Mubarak, whatever his sins, had at least accomplished that much for peace.
The revolution of 2011 hoped for a democratic government, but had no concrete reason to expect one, and no plan was in place to institute one. To the contrary, a plan was in place - a plan unknown to most of the revolutionaries in the streets - a plan to discard the desire for democracy as soon as it had been exploited to remove Mubarak.
With that absurd statement - the idea that transitions of power in the Middle East could be peaceful and could result in democratic governments - Obama revealed one of two things: Either he
had been inadequately informed about the true nature of the situation in Egypt, a failure in information-gathering, or he believed that whatever replaced Mubarak would be better than Mubarak, even though it would not be democratic. Either his
advisors are hopelessly naive regarding what's going on, or he is secretly on the side of Muslim radicals and believes that the overthrow of our allies will hasten their rise to power.
Regarding the accuracy of the information presented to President Obama in various briefings, the question arises whether the true nature of the Muslim Brotherhood has been discerned by those who advise the president:
Less than two weeks after Obama made his mincing declaration that Mubarak must go, his Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood was "largely secular." Within hours, the administration refuted Clapper's absurd claim, reinforcing the fact that its foreign policy is chaotic at best, subversive at worst.
Although Mubarak was an unsavory character - nobody will claim him as a champion of human rights - he did at least maintain a peace effort with other nations in the Middle East, and maintain some degree of domestic tranquility. The seizure of power by the Muslim Brotherhood ensures the increased probability of open war in the region, and violence by the Egyptian government against its own citizens.
In addition to revealing the administration's ineptitude, its positions with regard to Egypt helped reveal where Obama really stands: firmly against a strong ally of the United States and Israel. While the Mubarak regime was dictatorial, it did maintain order in the streets and suppress Islamist radicals. It also maintained peace with Israel.
It is useful to recall the distinction between "Islamic" and "Islamist" - the former refers to a faith, the latter to political ideology and the agenda attached to it. Mubarak had protected the Egyptian people from the oppression of such radicals, and been an ally to the United States. What was to be gained by his ouster? The government which would replace him was not guaranteed to be as friendly to the U.S., and would likely be less friendly. The regime which would take his place would grant no more civil rights to Egyptian citizens, and probably less. The revolutionaries in the streets would be bitterly disappointed. Having gotten rid of a bad dictator, they would find themselves under an even worse government.
Within a matter of weeks, Mubarak stepped down. As ... the Muslim Brotherhood was moving toward taking over Egypt, the Egyptian military stepped in and took charge.
Although some observers still hoped that the military would merely oversee a transitional period, the wiser revolutionaries in Egypt understood quickly that the game was over. They had been duped. Obama's
support of the ouster of Mubarak - under whom Coptic Christians were allowed to worship in peace - has led to the rise of violence toward Christians by Muslims. In October 2011, 26 Coptic Christians were killed and hundreds more wounded in attacks by the Egyptian military. The attack occurred as Christian groups marched through Cairo in protest against the burnings of their churches. Egyptian Muslims pelted them with rocks as they moved along, and by the time they had reached their destination at a radio and TV broadcasting facility, the army started shooting into the crowd and trying to run over the protesters with their vehicles. Observers predicted that the event would cause a massive emigration of Christians from Egypt.
The violent factions which Mubarak had held back were now unleashed - violent scenes like these were free to repeat themselves throughout Egypt. Mubarak was no angel - he was a thug - but he had also engineered a way to keep Coptic Christians and Muslims living together in the same country with a minimum of friction. The occasional incidents of violence by Muslims against Copts prior to the end of the Mubarak regime would be multiplied many times over after he left power.
In the wake of the murder of more than two dozen unarmed Christians by the Egyptian military, the president called on Christians to show restraint! How were they supposed to do that? By allowing more of their brethren to be murdered by the military? The president continued: "Now is the time for restraint on all sides so that Egyptians can move forward together to forge a strong and united Egypt." The loss of life was "tragic," but Christians need to put it behind them?
Observers noted Obama's under-reaction to the open aggression against an unarmed pacifistic religious minority within Egypt.
No international sanctions against the Egyptian military? No condemnation of an obvious hate crime against Christians? No withdrawing of U.S. foreign aid from Egypt?
Reasonable surveillance and reconnaissance certainly would have predicted the scenario of domestic violence which erupted once Mubarak was gone.
After Mubarak's ouster, the Egyptian military demonstrated that it was incapable of maintaining order. Reports began to emerge out of Egypt that indicated there were no police on the streets in Cairo and other cities. Coptic Christians, who make up about ten percent of Egypt's population, were clashing with Muslims, and the result was extensive casualties. Ambulances were nowhere to be seen, and the wounded were transported to medical facilities in garbage trucks. Roadblocks were frequently set up, not by the government, but by lawless thugs who stopped traffic and stole valuables from the occupants of the automobiles they detained. Without a functioning police force, vigilante groups sprang up, taking the law into their own hands. Reports also surfaced that the Egyptian army was partnering with the Muslim Brotherhood to perform "virginity tests" on women who protested in Tahrir Square.
Unspeakable acts of violence against women multiplied, perpetrated by the military, by the Muslim Brotherhood, and by unaligned thugs. Nobody was there to stop them. Around the world, the "girl in the blue bra" became a symbol for women who were mistreated, beaten, and worse by the Muslim Brotherhood. As time went on, it became clear that large and larger parts of the military were controlled, visibly and invisibly, by the Muslim Brotherhood. This eruption of mayhem was predictable. What was the strategy of the Obama administration? Perhaps it thought that if President Obama urged restraint, via TV and radio and internet and newspapers, his influence would steer the Egyptian population.
Just as the revolutionaries in the streets during the "Arab Spring" had their hopes dashed, so also were America's hopes for an ally dashed - Egypt after Mubarak would not be an ally, would not work for peace in the Middle East, and would not restrain the worst excesses of the radical Muslim Brotherhood. Peaceful and moderate Muslims were also dismayed; they are not represented by the Muslim Brotherhood.
Egypt is under military rule with the ouster of Mubarak. Although there remain deep divisions between Islamists and those who favor a secular government, the overwhelming likelihood is that the Islamic Brotherhood will prevail. With Mubarak gone, the transition to either a military government or one founded on Islamic law is guaranteed.
Although there are formalities yet to be accomplished, it is a done deal. While there is a nominal struggle between militarists and the Muslim Brotherhood, the reality is that there are enough connections between the two that the practical effects will be the same no matter which side wins. As the Los Angeles Times reported on July 11, 2012,
Months of multi-stage elections in Egypt have resulted in a slow-burning power struggle between the ascendant Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Mubarak-allied generals of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.
With hopes for freedom and democracy dashed, the revolutionaries have gone home. They are not protesting in the streets. They have resigned themselves, after a brief flicker of hope during the Arab Spring, to a long Arab Winter. The L.A. Times notes that "things in Egypt are incredibly quiet."
Whether the new Egyptian president, Mohammad Mursi of the Muslim Brotherhood, continues to consolidate his power, or whether the military gains might, is a question of no significant outcome. The case is clear: in a part of the world in which things can never be good, in a part of the world in which the only variation is between bad and worse, Egypt has taken a turn for the worse.
