Friday, December 22, 2017

From Dunkirk to North Africa: Britain Revitalizes the War Effort

In early 1940, the British military forces, which had come to western Europe in an effort to slow or stop the advance of the German army, were steadily retreating. Soon they were pinned down around Dunkirk, a town on France’s northern coast.

Inside the British government, some leaders wanted to meet the Nazis at a conference and negotiate a peace treaty. They would have let Hitler continue to control the German army and most of Europe.

Those who favored the idea of a peace conference feared that they’d lose a fight against Hitler. This fear was reasonable in light of the fact that the British military needed to be evacuated from Dunkirk to avoid be captured in its entirety.

But peace negotiations would imply and require at least a modicum of trust. Those opposed to a peace conference pointed out that Hitler was not to be trusted.

Inside the British government, there was a tension between those who wanted a peace conference and those who opposed the idea. Prime Minister Winston Churchill would break that tension, as historian Larry Arnn writes:

The day on which Churchill put an end to the idea of a peace conference was May 28, 1940. He walked into the cabinet room and made a stirring speech, which in the diary of Minister of Economic Warfare Hugh Dalton ended with these words: “If this long island story of ours is to end at last, let it end only when each one of us lies choking in his own blood upon the ground.” This speech, which provoked a demonstration of enthusiasm that swept throughout the government, was not a product of any trend or great evolution of history. It spoke in defiance of those forces.

A bit more than a year later, in late 1941 and early 1942, Churchill was developing his strategy for the war. The air war raged over England, but the Germans had not invaded Britain, and the British military was rebounding from the debacle at Dunkirk.

The British were not yet ready for a direct confrontation in Europe with the German military. As historians Peter Maslowski and Allan Millett write,

Reverting to their traditional approach of defeating continental enemies, the British wanted to avoid a direct confrontation with a full-strength Wehrmacht in northern Europe until this confrontation carried no risk of a 1914-1918 stalemate. Instead they urged operations in the Mediterranean theater, where they were already engaged and where their scarce naval, air, and ground forces had some some ability to check the Germans and Italians. Churchill stressed that the Mediterranean theater offered many strategic opportunities, since the African littoral could be wrested from the Vichy French forces in Morocco and Algeria and the German-Italian army campaigning in the Libyan-Egyptian area against the British 8th Army. Churchill argued that a 1942 campaign in this area would divert German troops from Russia and strengthen the British war effort. What he did not say was that this campaign would be British-commanded (thus presumably using the greatest Allied expertise in generalship) and help restore the integrity of the British Empire, which Churchill desperately wanted to preserve.

Especially in the areas of North Africa, including Egypt, and the Near East, maintaining some sense of the British Empire was crucial to keeping the peace. This would become painfully clear after the war.

The French and British presence in the Near East had already become less decisive in the wake of WW1. The Europeans had paid too high a price, both in terms of lives and in terms of money, to continue to devote a high level of resources to keeping the region policed.

Although the Near East had been civilized millennia before Europe, the region’s civilizations had become notably less humane and less peaceful in recent centuries. The French and British presence in broad swaths of the area - much of which had formerly been Ottoman possessions - kept a lid on the periodic feuds and bloodbaths which erupted on a regular basis.

Churchill was, even in the grim days of early 1942, thinking ahead to a postwar era, and thinking of ways to maintain peace in that era. Sadly, the British Empire would continue fading, and more than half a century of violence in Near East, during the postwar decades, has shown that the absence of French and British occupational troops led to increased violence.

Human civilization paid a high price in order to defeat Hitler. While millions of Germans were freed from his cruel Nazi dictatorship, millions of people in the Near East were left exposed as major European powers could no longer afford to keep the peace there.

Wednesday, December 6, 2017

Global Climatic Instability: A Continuation of Ancient Trends

Variations in the Earth’s climate have caused researchers to look for the causes of such changes. Specifically, certain political groups have asserted that warming and cooling trends could be anthropogenic, and have sought evidence to support this view.

The notion propagated over social media is roughly this, that since the increased use of ‘fossil fuels’ (coal, oil, and natural gas) started in the late 1700s, emissions, specifically carbon dioxide have accumulated in the earth’s atmosphere and thereby initiated changes in the climate.

Long-term trends in the planet’s climate, however, predate large-scale industrialization.

A wide variety of techniques allow researchers to measure conditions prior to the advent of recorded readings from thermometers: core samples from ice or soil; tree-ring evaluation; written records quantifying the expansion and contraction of glaciers, and gauging snowfall and rainfall; and general agricultural and naturalistic records documenting which types of plant thrived in various locations.

From such measurements, it is possible to accurately reconstruct a climatic history of the Earth. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sets forth a history which includes a Roman Warm Period (ending around 400 A.D.), a Dark Ages Cold Period (ending around 950 A.D.), a Medieval Warm Period (ending around 1250 A.D.), and a Little Ice Age (ending around 1870 A.D.).

Naturally, these dates are not precise, but rather indicate a general and gradual change in a trend. Terminology varies somewhat, as the Medieval Warm Period is, e.g., also known as the Medieval Climate Optimum or the Medieval Climate Anomaly (MCA). The IPCC notes that

New warm-season temperature reconstructions covering the past 2 millennia show that warm European summer conditions were prevalent during 1st century, followed by cooler conditions from the 4th to the 7th century.

What seems, in the short-term context of a century or two, to be a warming trend, is in the larger context of several millennia merely the global climate emerging from end of the Little Ice Age.

A visual graph on a Cartesian plane of the Earth’s climatic temperature over time would look something like a sine wave, warming and cooling patterns following each other over the centuries. The IPCC writes that

Persistent warm conditions also occurred during the 8th–11th centuries, peaking throughout Europe during the 10th century. Prominent periods with cold summers occurred in the mid-15th and early 19th centuries.

This pattern extends backward in time long before the commencement of the large-scale use of fossil fuel. The planet has experienced centuries in which northern Europe and North America had temperatures warm enough to support subtropical plant life.

Conversely, there were centuries in which, e.g., large parts of northern and central Africa experience temperatures consistent with temperate zones. These extremes occurred at a time when the use of coal, oil, and gas was nearly unknown. The IPCC reports that

There is high confidence that northern Fennoscandia from 900 to 1100 was as warm as the mid-to-late 20th century.

The pattern which emerges, then, is a steady sinusoid pattern, with the planet’s climate alternating between warm periods and cool periods every few centuries. This general pattern seems to continue unaffected by any anthropogenic variables.

If the use of fossil fuels were capable of altering the earth’s climate, then other human activities of comparable size and scope should be also capable of producing changes in climate.

But other human actions, like the shockingly large number of atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs detonated during the era of frequent bomb tests, have had no long-term measurable effect on the climate. The explosion of over 2,000 nuclear weapons over a few years was not capable of altering the climate.

If the weapons-testing programs were not capable of producing long-term warming or cooling trends (they might have had temporary localized effects), then it’s much less likely that the comparatively smaller use of fossil fuel would generate any change in climate trends.

The reliability of the sinusoid as a best-fit pattern for global climate stands, even though individual data points are sometimes outliers which depart from the best-fit line, as the IPCC indicates:

The evidence also suggests warm conditions during the 1st century, but comparison with recent temperatures is restricted because long-term temperature trends from tree-ring data are uncertain.
It would be noteworthy, even surprising, if the planet weren’t in the midst of a warming or cooling trend. The ‘normal’ condition of the Earth’s climate is to be in constant change.

Going back several thousand years, the Earth’s climate has demonstrated a semi-regular pattern of alternating between several warm centuries and several cool centuries. In light of this historical record, the climate’s current behavior is within ranges established by this pattern.

Because temperature trends in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are consistent with the tendencies observed in previous millennia, there might be no need to search for extraordinary or anthropogenic causes. The IPCC notes that the MCA, a millennium ago, was likely even warmer than the current twenty-first century climate:

In the European Alps region, tree-ring based summer temperature reconstructions show higher temperatures in the last decades than during any time in the MCA, while reconstructions based on lake sediments show as high, or slightly higher temperatures during parts of the MCA compared to most recent decades.

Likewise, the Roman Warm Period, beginning around 250 B.C., was perhaps warmer than the current climate:

The longest summer temperature reconstructions from parts of the Alps show several intervals during Roman and earlier times as warm (or warmer) than most of the 20th century.

In sum, the climate is ‘changing’ only in the sense that it has been continuously and predictably changing for at least the last two millennia. The climate is doing nothing extraordinary.

Observed and measured temperatures, and warming and cooling trends, do not correlate with the onset of industrialization and the widespread use of fossil fuels. The data do not suggest that any generalizations gathered from climatic observation are anthropogenic.

Tuesday, December 5, 2017

Chiang in Context: China in the Mid 1930s

As the leader of mainland China from 1928 to 1949, and the leader of Taiwan China from 1949 to 1975, Chiang Kai-shek experienced many ups and downs. Throughout his time in mainland China, he wrestled continuously against the communists, either in a state of outright war, or in an uneasy truce.

Mao, the leader of the communists, at times found it expedient to lavishly if insincerely praise Chiang. The communists would exploit times of ceasefire during the ongoing Chinese civil war to regroup and rebuild their strength, and then resume their attack.

The war inside mainland China lasted from 1927 to 1949, and so was largely coextensive with Chiang’s tenure as leader there.

Although the struggle was long, there were times at which things went well for the ‘Nationalists,’ as those who defended the Chinese against communism were called. Historian Jay Taylor writes about the year 1936:

Despite continuing civil wars, the depression, depredations by Japan, and preparation for a general war, the power and authority of the Chinese central government was greater than at any time since the Taiping Uprising. In the spring, displaying military, political, and covert action skills, Chiang had quickly put down another rebellion by the Guangxi Clique and the usual dissidents in Guangdong. The rebels had again charged Chiang with appeasement and dictatorship but essentially the rebellion reflected the ongoing power struggle between the warlords and the central government. In their own provinces, the warlords were more like dictators than Chiang Kai-shek was, and within two years their preferred national leader, Wang Jingwei — at the moment still in Europe — would defect to Japan. Chiang's generous treatment of the incorrigible southerners, even sending them three million central government yuan or fabi in emergency aid, was an act of enlightened self-interest, which is perhaps all one can expect of a national leader.

The Guangxi region has a long cultural history - predating and outlasting Chiang - of being fiercely independent, and not identifying with the rest of mainland China. Mao, then, was not the only headache which Chiang faced.

In the southernmost part of China, and bordering on Guangxi, was the Guangdong region, which likewise had a traditionally independent attitude. Therefore many of Chiang’s troubles came from the south.

Wang Jingwei was a competitor who wanted Chiang’s power, but Wang Jingwei would obtain significance only to the extent that he attached himself either to the communists or the Japanese. In 1932, Chiang and Wang Jingwei had reached a compromise in which Wang Jingwei assumed political leadership of the Nationalist party, while Chiang led the military and much of the government.

Although the communists would ultimately succeed in subjugating mainland China and ousting Chiang, his two decades of leadership were not an unmitigated tragedy. At many points, things seemed to be going well.