Even before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, U.S. involvement in the Pacific war was inevitable. America would enter the conflict because of its alliances with Australia, Britain, and France, and also because the Philippines and other islands in the area were U.S. protectorates, territories, or possessions.
As the leader of China, Chiang Kai-shek welcomed U.S. and British involvement in the war, because it meant that China would have allies against Japan. Until that point in time, China had faced Japan almost alone.
Chiang, however, was fighting two wars at once. The external war was Japan’s attack on, and invasion of, China. The internal war was a raging civil war between Chiang’s government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Starting in 1927, the CCP had been committed to the violent overthrow of the Chinese government. Lasting over two decades, the Chinese Civil War would leave millions dead.
When the Japanese attacked China in 1937, a ceasefire in the civil war was declared, and the CCP promised to cooperate with the Chinese government in a mutual effort to defend China against the Japanese. But the CCP kept its promise at best partially. The soldiers of the CCP were organized into the “New Fourth Army,” which was supposed to coordinate its activities with the armies of China and take orders from the Chinese high command. But the Fourth Army sometimes didn’t follow orders, or did so only deliberate delay.
As dangerous as the Communists were, however, Chiang was forced to pay more attention to the Japanese invasion, because it presented a more urgent danger. He was delighted that the United States would support China against Japan. But what he didn’t know was that the U.S. representative, sent to facilitate cooperation between America and China, was actually a Soviet spy.
Neither the U.S. government, which sent Lauchlin Currie to China as its representative, nor the Chinese government which happily received him, realized that he was part of a Soviet Socialist espionage network, as historian Jay Taylor writes:
This development was good news for Chiang. Despite all the staggering defeats, failures, and losses of the past three years, as well as the stupendous problems of trying to run a government, economy, and army in exile and of virtual international isolation, Chiang had remained steadfast in his belief that he and China would eventually prevail over Japan. Because of the Soviet factor, he would never be as certain about the ultimate outcome of the struggle with Mao’s CCP, but that problem could be tackled later. What was important now was that while the Fourth Army Incident and its aftermath were still reverberating inside China, the informal Sino-American alliance was developing rapidly. Most importantly, President Roosevelt had included China in his new and dramatic Lend-Lease Bill, which was intended primarily to save England through the provision of vast amounts of war matériel. The President had also decided to send a personal representative to talk with Chiang. The representative, Lauchlin Currie, played a key role in the White House on Far Eastern affairs, although his official titles of personal economic adviser and administrative assistant to the President had nothing to do with foreign affairs and he knew little or nothing about China. Currie, however, had another unusual distinction — he was a member of a group of officials in Washington whom Moscow considered its “agents of influence.” Most of these men and women were motivated by personal ideals, sympathy for the Soviet Union, hatred of fascism, and liberal economic and social views. Some, like Currie, were not members of the Communist Party and probably were at most democratic-socialists, but they believed that the fascist threat overrode most other considerations and that in promoting the interests of Moscow and providing it sensitive information they were also serving the interests of their own country. They would have objected to being called “agents of influence,” but at the minimum they showed atrocious judgment. After all, the Soviet Union was then allied to Nazi Germany, suggesting that their ideological motivations were not, after all, primarily antifascist.
Currie’s assignment from President Roosevelt was to liaise between the United States and China, specifically for the purpose of bolstering the war effort against Japan. But Currie’s own objective was to undermine the Chinese government and strengthen the CCP’s attempts to overthrow that government.
Chiang Kai-shek was happy to receive aid from the United States. He made substantial requests for more.
When Chiang received Currie in Chungking on February 10, the American informed him that the United States would soon deliver to China US$45 million of arms and military equipment. After an expression of thanks, Chiang also asked for financial assistance to help stabilize the Chinese currency (the fabi), and assistance in improving the Burma Road. But this was only the beginning. On March 31, T.V. Soong presented Currie a comprehensive request on behalf of the commander in chief, including 1,000 military aircraft and arms for thirty divisions. Some of the airplanes were needed to equip a new Chinese Air Force unit to be led by Claire Chennault, a crusty, retired U.S. Army Air Force Captain with the “honorific” title of Colonel. Since 1937, Chennault had been advising Chiang and directing the training of what remained of the Chinese Air Force.
The connection to the U.S. was vital to the Chinese war effort. Yet that connection had to go, in part, through Lauchlin Currie, a permanent enemy of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese government.
The Soviet Socialist government was at that time allied with Hitler’s National Socialist (“Nazi”) government.
The Soviets were also allied with the CCP. Hitler was allied with the Japanese, who had invaded and were still attacking China.
So the civil war inside China, between the CCP and Chiang’s nationalist government, was linked to the war outside China, with the CCP allied to the Nazis, the Soviets, and the Japanese, while Chiang’s government was allied to the United States.
The 1937 ceasefire between the CCP and Chiang’s government was tenuous at best. Both sides were as eager to fight each other as they were to fight the Japanese.
Thus Chiang was shocked when Lauchlin Currie flatly stated that the CCP and Chiang’s government should consolidate and form a united front against the Japanese:
Currie also passed on to Chiang Roosevelt’s hope that the KMT and the CCP would be able to form a true united front to fight Japan. Taken aback, Chiang replied that it was his view that the CCP’s principal loyalty was to the Communist International and the Soviet Union. The Communists, he said, did not want to see an alliance among China, America, and Britain. At the time, Chiang’s assertion was an undeniable fact. But Currie did not agree with any of these premises and he left Chiang with the clear impression that in the coming war, the Americans would have one goal — defeat of the Germans and the Japanese — and since the CCP was part of the united front against Japan, it would also be considered a friend. Chiang understood that his strikingly different view of the CCP would bedevil the most important foreign relationship he and his government would ever have. But aside from this issue, Chiang was immensely pleased by the visit — an alliance with the powerful United States seemed likely within a year.
Because Lauchlin Currie was operating as part of the Soviet espionage network, he was indifferent to Chiang’s assessments of the situation in China, indifferent to Chiang’s requests, and indifferent to Chiang’s views. But Currie was eager to relay opinions and requests of the CCP to the U.S. government.
Chiang’s political party was called the Kuomintang (KMT). The CCP worked to form a negative impression of the KMT in Currie’s mind, a false impression which Currie would then carry back to Washington, D.C.
Before leaving Chungking, Currie met privately with Zhou Enlai, who was very positive and convivial, portraying the Communists as patriotic reformers interested in democracy and full of praise for the idea of U.S. support for China against Japan. Zhou, however, warned that the KMT leader’s policies could lead to a civil war and a collapse of the resistance. He was not so frank as to mention that his party at that moment continued vehemently to oppose a U.S.-China alliance, fearing that Japan’s defeat by such a partnership would give Chiang a powerful claim to leadership.
Currie faithfully carried Zhou Enlai’s pro-communist messages back to Washington, D.C.
(Because of varying transliteration, Zhou Enlai is also known as Chou En-Lai.)
Lauchlin Currie was only one of several Soviet agents who were working inside the U.S. government. These operatives had a number of tasks. One of them was to weaken American enthusiasm for Chiang’s government, and thereby aid the CCP in its efforts to overthrow that government.
The international communist conspiracy, promoted by the Soviet Socialists, did indeed eventually influence America’s policy. As seen above, the U.S. wanted a united front between the CCP and Chiang. It was hopelessly naive to imagine that the Chinese communists would work together with Chiang’s government to defend China against the Japanese.
The CCP would rather wait while Japan shredded China and Chiang’s government, which would make it easier for the Communists to assume control, once the country and the government were thus weakened. The CCP was allied with the Soviet Socialists, who were, in turn, allied with Japan and with the Nazis. The Chinese Communists were thus allied with Japan.
In Washington, Currie and others succeeded in reducing the amount of aid which Chiang would receive from the United States. By influencing U.S. foreign policy this way, Lauchlin Currie and the other Soviet spies inside the American government contributed to the final downfall of Chiang’s government in 1949, contributed to the establishment of a ruthless Communist dictatorship in China, and contributed to the death of millions of Chinese.
The fact that the Communists took control of China has led to an amazing number of deaths. Between 1958 and 1961, the CCP operated a program known as ‘The Great Leap Forward.’ The result was the starvation of at least 30 million Chinese people, the execution of at least 2.5 million, and the forced suicides of at least another 1 million. These numbers represent the lower end of the ranges reported.
The CCP organized another wave of violence from 1966 to 1976 and called it ‘The Cultural Revolution.’ Estimates vary substantially: the CCP executed between 1 million and 20 million people during this program.
The Great Leap Forward and The Cultural Revolution were the two most violent periods of Communism’s rule over China. Other periods also included mass executions and the deaths of prisoners in camps.
Lauchlin Currie does not bear sole responsibility for the millions of Chinese who suffered and died. The fall of Chiang’s government and the rise of the CCP led to one of the most horrifying catastrophes in history: it led to mass murder and it led to the widespread violation of human rights in China.
