Difficult Times in Chile

The South American country of Chile was ruled by General Pinochet from September 1973 until 1989. Pinochet had come to power in a coup, killing his predecessor Salvador Allende, who had come to power in 1970. Depending on one's politics, there is a temptation to see one of these two men as "the good guy" and the other one as the bad guy. But in reality, the situation is more complicated, and more bleak.

General Pinochet was the 58th commander-in-chief of the Chilean army. (Unlike the United States, the commander-in-chief is not the same as the president, although an individual can inhabit both offices at once.) For there to have been 58 men in this office in Chile's history, from 1813 until 1973, illustrates a very high turnover rate in this office. By comparison, from 1942 to 2011, the United States has had 18 Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Not only is the tenure in office shorter for the Chilean military commanders, but many of them ended their tenures by being assassinated by rival officers.

The intrinsic instability of Chile's system is also seen in the presidency, which - while not quite as unstable as the commander-in-chief's office, has had periods of time in which average tenure in office was rather short.

The individual personalities of Pinochet and Allende are symptoms of an inherent problem in Chile. Neither of them was able to govern with consistent success: according to historian William Duiker, Allende

began to move toward socialism by nationalizing the largest domestic and foreign-owned corporations. Nationalization of the copper industry - essentially without compensation for the owners - caused

distrust among both the Chilean citizens and foreign powers. Allende's radical moves were designed to address Chile's chronic economic problems of inflation, debt, and unemployment. Allende's actions didn't do much to fix the problem, and generated enough ill-will for Pinochet to topple him.

Pinochet, for his part, tried a different economic strategy: he moved to

restore many nationalized industries and landed estates to their original owners.

This move did create a modest upswing in the economy, but was implemented with a heavy-handedness that cost Pinochet some of his popular support:

Although Pinochet's regime liberalized the economy, its flagrant abuse of human rights led to growing unrest against the government.

Ultimately, neither Allende nor Pinochet can be seen as successful. Chile lurched from dogmatic socialism under Allende to Pinochet's "crony capitalism" that lacked a truly free market. The underlying social and cultural factors are inherited traditions and views of leadership, common in Spanish-speaking cultures, that do not provide a welcoming environment for either democracy or free-market creativity. The free exchange of opinions, and the inventive use of capital to create opportunities for wealth, are ignored in favor of institutional power and cronyism.

These same problems face many countries in both South America and Central America; these are, in part, inherited echoes of the same cultural and social patterns which have kept Spain from being a leading power in Europe. The last several centuries have seen Spain fail to be at the center of the political and economic trends of Europe.

Geographically, Chile is situated for excellent economic opportunity, and in the post-Pinochet era has begun to grow some of its export potential. Will Chile be able to break free of its past, its cultures, and its traditions? Will Chile be able to avoid both heavy-handed militaristic authoritarianism, and also avoid doctrinaire socialism, and find that middle route to a free society and a free market?