In 1800, the Qing or Manchu dynasty (1644-1911) appeared to be at the height of its power. The Manchus, a seminomadic people whose original homeland was north of the Great Wall, had invaded China in the mid-seventeenth century and conquered the tottering Ming dynasty in 1644. Under the rule of two great emperors, Kangxi (1661-1722) and Qianlong (1736-1795), China had then experienced a long period of peace and prosperity. Its borders were secure, and its culture and intellectual achievements were the envy of the world. Its rulers, hidden behind the walls of the Forbidden City in Beijing, had every reason to describe their patrimony as the Central Kingdom, China’s historical name for itself. But a little over a century later, humiliated and harassed by the black ships and big guns of the Western powers, the Qing dynasty, the last in a series that had endured for more than two thousand years, collapsed in the dust.
The “mandate of heaven” seemed to be over. Many factors were at work during the last century of the Qing dynasty. Contact with other nations increased, despite the government’s longstanding official isolationist policies. Social tensions had long existed inside China, and they grew stronger in the years leading up to 1911.
When Western pressure on the Manchu Empire began to increase during the early nineteenth century, it served to exacerbate the existing strains in Chinese society. By 1800, the trade relationship that restricted Western merchants to a small commercial outlet at Canton was no longer acceptable to the British, who chafed at the growing trade imbalance resulting from a growing appetite for Chinese tea. Their solution was opium. A product more addictive than tea, opium was grown under company sponsorship in northeastern India and then shipped directly to the Chinese market. Soon demand for the product in South China became insatiable, despite an official prohibition on its use. Bullion now flowed out of the Chinese imperial treasury into the pockets of British merchants and officials.
Europeans, especially the English, wanted to correct the trade imbalance and wanted the Chinese to spend their bullion (gold and silver). The word ‘bullion’ refers to precious metals used in trade by weight, instead of in coin form. The most common example is gold bars. (This is different than ‘bouillon’ which is broth!) Creating a favorable balance of trade - making sure that you export as much or more than you import - is a historical factor which drives countries to invent new products, or seek new markets. Europeans wanted to trade with China, but China was not interested in most of the goods the Europeans had to offer. Despite both European and Chinese law against its use, the product that the Europeans had the most success in selling was opium.
When the Chinese attempted to prohibit the opium trade, the British declared war. The Opium War lasted three years (1839-1842) and graphically demonstrated the superiority of British firepower and military tactics to those of the Chinese.
Although the Qing / Manchu dynasty would last another 70 years or so, its decline in power was clear.
Even more ominous developments were taking place in the Chinese heartland, where European economic penetration led to the creation of so-called spheres of influence dominated by diverse foreign powers. Although the imperial court retained theoretical sovereignty throughout the country, in practice its political, economic, and administrative influence beyond the region of the capital was increasingly circumscribed.
Within China’s borders, areas were marked off, to be controlled by Russia, Japan, England, Germany, France, and Italy. It was clear that the imperial dynasty was no longer the actual authority in China. By 1911, the imperial government would fall, and although it was replaced by Sun Yat-sen’s nationalist democracy, instability would mark China from 1911 until 1949. Internal conflicts between nationalists and communists, and external conflicts with the attacking Japanese, prevented the solidification of a durable sociopolitical arrangement.
With the triumph of the communists in 1949, under the leadership of Mao Zedong (also spelled ‘Mao Tse-tung’), China was able to assert itself against foreign influences and once again chart its own course, even if that course was disastrous. China regained its sovereignty and autonomy, perhaps at the cost of human rights and individual freedoms. China’s new challenge would be to overcome the oppressor within (Mao and the communists) instead of the oppressors from outside (foreign economic powers).
Many observers speculated that overpopulation would be China’s next major challenge. Widespread food shortages after the 1949 revolution encouraged that view. But it has become clear that the near-famine conditions were due to mismanagement by communist officials, and surprisingly that, instead of overpopulation, underpopulation may be the next major challenge for China. The Washington Post reports:
More than 30 years after China’s one-child policy was introduced, creating two generations of notoriously chubby, spoiled only children affectionately nicknamed “little emperors,” a population crisis is looming in the country. The average birthrate has plummeted to 1.8 children per couple as compared with six when the policy went into effect, according to the U.N. Population Division, while the number of residents 60 and older is predicted to explode from 16.7 percent of the population in 2020 to 31.1 percent by 2050. That is far above the global average of about 20 percent.
The economic, social, and political disaster awaiting a country with such a low birthrate is as bad - or possibly worse - than the cruelties inflicted upon it by either domestic communists or foreign imperialists. Far from being overpopulated - the carrying capacity of Chinese territory with sustainable, renewable, and responsible land management would support a much larger population with food and with clean air and water - China faces a future of economic collapse and social chaos if it fails to have more children. An ideal birthrate is somewhere in excess of 2 children per couple. Patrick Buchanan writes:
Using UN projections of a Chinese population of 1.4 billion by 2050, this translates into 440 million people in China over the age of sixty, an immense burden of retired, elderly, and aging for the labor force to carry and the country to care for. Shanghai is already approaching that point, with more than 20 percent of its population over sixty, while the birthrate is below one child per couple, one of the lowest anywhere on earth. Due to Beijing’s one-couple, one-child policy, which has led to tens of millions of aborted baby girls, 12 to 15 percent of young Chinese men will be unable to find wives. As single males are responsible for most of society’s violence, the presence of tens of millions of young single Chinese men portends a time of trouble in the Middle Kingdom.
As the Chinese government begins to abandon its “one-child” policy, and even in some cases begins to encourage married couples to have more children, the question facing China now is whether or not it is too late, and whether China can rebuild its population. The Chinese can only survive by having many more children than they currently do. But will they do it? Some Chinese couples find the idea of having more than one child, even if that is necessary for the survival of the nation, financially challenging. The Washington Post writes:
Yang Jiawei, 27, and his wife, Liu Juanjuan, 26, said they would love to have two children and are legally allowed to do so. But like many Chinese, they have only the scant medical and life insurance provided by the government. Without a social safety net, they say, the choice would be irresponsible. “People in the West wrongly see the one-child policy as a rights issue,” said Yang, a construction engineer whose wife is seven months pregnant with the couple's first child. “Yes, we are being robbed of the chance to have more than one child. But the problem is not just some policy. It is money.”
Other Chinese couples have the financial ability to have more children, but simply don’t want to, having gotten used to the self-indulgent lifestyle of the “one-child" era. The Washington Post continues, interviewing Wang Weijia, a 31-year-old human resources administrator with an 8-month-old son:
Other couples cite psychological reasons for hesitating. Wang, the human resources administrator, said she wants an only child because she was one herself: “We were at the center of our families and used to everyone taking care of us. We are not used to taking care of and don’t really want to take care of others.” Chen Zijian, a 42-year-old who owns a translation company, put it more bluntly. For the dual-career, middle-class parents who are bringing the birthrate down, he said, it’s about being successful enough to be selfish. Today’s 20- and 30-somethings grew up seeing their parents struggle during the early days of China’s experiment with capitalism and don’t want that kind of life for themselves, he said. Even one child makes huge demands on parents’ time, he said. “A mother has to give up at least two years of her social life.” Then there are the space issues - “You have to remodel your apartment” - and the strategizing - “You have to have a résumé ready by the time the child is 9 months old for the best preschools.” Most of his friends are willing to deal with this once, Chen said, but not twice. “Ours is the first generation with higher living standards,” he said. “We do not want to make too many sacrifices.”
It is a clear law of economics that a nation needs a population growing at a slow but steady pace in order to have a sustainable standard of living. Will China be able to manage it?
