Describing the setting for what will be decisive moments in the twenty-first century, Robert Kaplan describes the situation of the nations which border the South China Sea. Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and China ring this body of water which is the main navigational route between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.
Geographically, the center and heart of this part of the world is water. Kaplan writes:
Europe is a landscape; East Asia is a seascape. Therein lies a crucial difference between the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The most contested areas of the globe in the last century lay on dry land in Europe, particularly in the flat expanse that rendered the eastern and western borders of Germany artificial, and thus exposed to intensive to-ing and fro-ing of armies. But starting in the last phase of the Cold War the demographic, economic, and military axis of the earth has measurably shifted to the opposite end of Eurasia, where the spaces between the principal nodes of population are overwhelmingly maritime. By maritime, I mean sea, air, and outer space: for ever since the emergence of aircraft carriers in the early decades of the twentieth century, sea and air battle formations have become increasingly inextricable, with outer space now added to the mix because of navigational and other assistance to ships and planes from satellites. Hence naval has become shorthand for several dimensions of military activity. And make no mistake, naval is the operative word. Because of the way that geography illuminates and sets priorities, the physical contours of East Asia argue for a naval century, with the remote possibility of land warfare on the Korean Peninsula being the striking exception.
The South China sea is a highway for billions of dollars of shipping, from agricultural products to finished high-tech machinery. More cargo moves through it than along any paved highway on land.
This body of water is also important in terms of military strategy, both because of the freight which moves through, and because any nation which would control it would also control the nations encircling it.
China is, of course, the single biggest power among these countries, but an alliance of several of the others would be something which China cannot afford to overlook. These smaller nations also look to the United States to support them diplomatically, and militarily if necessary, as they face China.
The United States must then decide if, for the sake of its own interests, or for the sake of Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, and the Philippines, it is willing to apply its power in this location. For this goal, an expansion and repurposing of the U.S. Navy might be necessary.
In May 2015, the Philippine GMA Network wrote about China’s slow but steady aggressive expansion into the South China Sea:
A Chinese state-owned newspaper said on Monday that "war is inevitable" between China and the United States over the South China Sea unless Washington stops demanding Beijing halt the building of artificial islands in the disputed waterway.
Who owns which parts of the South China Sea? Which parts are international waters, owned by no one nation? These are some of the questions which cause friction, and could potentially cause war. The GMA Network gives details:
China claims most of the South China Sea, through which $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes every year. The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei also have overlapping claims.
The United States has routinely called on all claimants to halt reclamation in the Spratlys, but accuses China of carrying out work on a scale that far outstrips any other country.
Washington has also vowed to keep up air and sea patrols in the South China Sea amid concerns among security experts that China might impose air and sea restrictions in the Spratlys once it completes work on its seven artificial islands.
China has said it had every right to set up an Air Defense Identification Zone in the South China Sea but that current conditions did not warrant one.
Even without war, however, China can increasingly manipulate the dynamics of the region. The Chinese government probably would prefer it that way - if it can succeed in establishing its tyranny over smaller countries and draining away their liberty without the expense and chaos of warfare, all the better for China.
Kaplan argues that China’s chances at aggressive imperialism are the result of a “gradual American decline, in a geopolitical sense.” The United States Navy has been slowly shrinking, both in size and in technological competitiveness.
The U.S. government has not demonstrated the will to protect American interests or lives. The historical axiom that ‘weakness is provocative’ takes effect in this situation: China could not possibly restrain itself from aggression, given a weak target. David Feith, writing in the Wall Street Journal, reports that
But even without war, Chinese military and economic power could erode the sovereignty of neighboring states, establishing Chinese hegemony over the world's most populous, economically powerful and strategically significant region — an outcome that grows more likely as the U.S. retrenches.
Without the United States, will the nations around the South China Sea be able to resist aggression from mainland China? One possible answer to that question is India. Historically, India has cultural connection to regions in Vietnam and Malaysia.
Those cultural connections are, by themselves, probably not enough to cause India to enter the fray. The diplomatic machinations around the South China Sea operation purely on calculations of power.
But India is also a rising economic power, one which seeks to compete with China. Bismarckian Realpolitik might well convince India that a Machiavellian excursion into the region could be to its advantage. One looming question for the twenty-first century is, then, whether, and to which extent, India might become a player in the South China Sea.
