Wednesday, March 9, 2016

The Economic and Political Glories of Habsburg Vienna

The twentieth century seemed, to many observers, to host the triumph of democracy. When the century began, hereditary dynasties directly governed many nations, and indirectly governed other nations as colonies.

Two world wars and the end of most global empires saw the emergence of newly independent states, some of which fell prey to socialist dictatorships, but others of which did indeed establish themselves as democracies of one sort or another.

The word ‘democracy’ can refer to a spectrum of governmental structures, the most effective of which is a republic with freely-elected representatives.

Those who rejoiced at the rise of democracy in the twentieth century assumed that it would effectively usher in an era of sustained personal freedom for nearly everyone in a society, and that it would foster an increase in opportunities, allowing more members of the lower classes to move into the middle classes.

Toward the end of the twentieth century, however, some of the anticipated benefits of democracy did not appear, or at least not to the extent expected.

The economies of the world’s democracies don’t always run smoothly. Inflation and unemployment, which appear cyclically in any economy, linger longer. The governments of the democratic nations accumulate public debt.

‘Safety net’ and ‘redistribution programs’ - like those designed to support the elderly or provide health care - have exacerbated government debt. Such programs transfer costs to the government, create an ever-growing dependency class among the lower classes, create a politics of entitlement among the middle classes, and are unsustainable in the long run, as individuals find ways to maximize received benefits while avoiding taxes, and as the recipient class grows while the productive class shrinks - which is the result of incentivizing membership in the recipient class, and the result of penalizing productivity.

Personal freedom and political liberty were the anticipated benefits of democracy, but Balkanization and tribalization have damaged both. As competing cultural groups sharpen their mutual enmity, they demand increasing conformity both from the their own members and from members of their opposition. Governments, seeking to moderate these tensions, reduce free speech, free press, and free expression. This is one source of what we now call ‘political correctness.’

Whereas ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ were once regarded as nearly synonymous, it is now clear that democracy can, and does, damage freedom.

This, in turn, gives rise to a reappraisal of history. Monarchies and other pre-democratic forms of government were once seen as the oppressive enemies of freedom. Now, however, historians note the amazing diversity and creativity of many monarchical societies. Economist Hans-Hermann Hoppe writes:

Meanwhile, Habsburg-Austria and the proto-typical pre-democratic Austrian experience assumed no more than historical interest. To be sure, it was not that Austria had not achieved any recognition. Even democratic intellectuals and artists from any field of intellectual and cultural endeavor could not ignore the enormous level of productivity of Austro-Hungarian and in particular Viennese culture. Indeed, the list of great names associated with late nineteenth and early twentieth century Vienna is seemingly endless. However, rarely has this enormous intellectual and cultural productivity been brought in a systematic connection with the pre-democratic tradition of the Habsburg monarchy. Instead, if it has not been considered a mere coincidence, the productivity of Austrian-Viennese culture has been presented “politically correctly” as proof of the positive synergistic effects of a multi-ethnic society and of multi-culturalism.

The impressive list of composers, poets, painters, architects, physicists, chemists, mathematicians, and philosophers who worked and thrived in Habsburg centers like Vienna and Prague is indeed long.

Democracy’s more simplistic enthusiasts are confounded by this result: they anticipate a gray uniformity in the absence of democracy, but instead they find an ingenuity and inventiveness exceeding that of many modern democratic societies. They anticipate a rigidly imposed uniformity in thought and worldview, but instead find a diversity of religious, economic, and political perspectives.

Once a host to Metternich’s suspicious view of free markets in 1814 and 1815, Vienna transformed itself into a thriving import-export economy a century later. Although the Kaiserlich und Königlich beaurocracy did represent an obstacle to economic flexibility, the imperial government was generally content to allow merchants to operate freely, and did not impose wage and price controls.

It is a mistake to institute democracy and anticipate that it will automatically produce personal freedom, political liberty, free markets, and prosperity.

It is possible, in any one context, that democracy can give rise to these benefits, but it is not necessary that it will do so.

Democracy was seen as desirable, not in and of itself, but rather because it was assumed that it was a means to these benefits. A wiser course may be to forsake the pursuit of democracy, and instead directly seek personal freedom, political liberty, free markets, and prosperity.