It was Joseph Stalin who authorized a request from Kim Il-sung to launch a surprise attack on South Korea in 1950. The North’s invasion of the South was the beginning of the Korean War. The DPRK’s belligerence has been constant since that time: although actual combat ceased in 1953, the North’s continual weapons buildup and militaristic rhetoric have left the nations of eastern Asia constantly wary.
Ironically, as the Soviet Union experienced occasional periods of relaxation in the post-Stalin era, including the rapprochement of detente in the 1970s and the perestroika and glasnost of Gorbachev in the 1980s, the DPRK became ever more harsh in its Stalinist tendencies.
The global diplomatic community, in the forms of SEATO, the UN, and NATO, have worked continuously to persuade North Korea to remain peaceful. Condoleezza Rice, who was at the time National Security Advisor, describes a moment in 2002 when it became clear that the efforts of various nations were not successful and that the DPRK was building a nuclear weapons program.
Colin Powell, who was at that time Secretary of State, had been working on a new version of a diplomatic strategy to pacify North Korea. But it was clear that the regime in Pyongyang, the DPRK’s capital, was unimpressed by anything which diplomacy might offer. There was no possibility of diplomacy persuading North Korea to move in the direction of peace.
On the contrary, the DPRK had formed a relationship with Abdul Qadeer Khan. Khan’s speciality was helping nations build nuclear weapons. He worked primarily with Islamic nations, but was willing to work with the Kim dynasty as well. Khan was the favored source by both Muslim dictatorships and North Korea. His professional goal was to spread weapons of mass destruction among nations who opposed democracy and liberty.
Condoleezza Rice recalls a moment in 2002 when it was clear that the DPRK was simply ignoring all diplomatic efforts and proceeding to build atomic weapons:
Colin advocated a bold approach, as he called it, prescribing engagement through a series of step-by-step moves by each side. His hope was that they’d lead to a different (if somewhat vague) new relationship between the United States and North Korea. Then, as the preparations were under way, a bombshell dropped from the intelligence community. Incomplete but troubling reports linking North Korea to the A.Q. Khan network had emerged. Moreover, Pyongyang had been suspected of seeking the components for uranium enrichment around the globe. Very close to the first anniversary of September 11, John McLaughlin, the deputy director of the CIA, reported the Agency’s assessment that North Korea had built a “production-scale” facility for uranium enrichment. Whatever the status of the Agreed Framework in slowing the plutonium program, the North appeared to be pursuing a second means of obtaining a nuclear weapon.
Diplomacy amounts to words — spoken words or written words — and diplomacy has achieved great things for the cause of peace. But in order for “the pen to be mightier than the sword,” in the famous words of Edward Bulwer-Lytton, at least a modicum of sincerity must be present on both sides of the negotiating table. North Korea is utterly cynical, and willing to say anything, sign anything, and agree to anything — and then do the very opposite.
In 2006, the DPRK revealed that it had successfully constructed nuclear weapons. In the following decade, it developed more and stronger weapons, as well as increasingly sophisticated long-range missiles capable of delivering those weapons to distant countries.
By 2017, the DPRK had built a substantial arsenal. Nikki Haley, who was U.S. ambassador to the United Nations at the time, writes:
In November, the North Korean regime launched an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting anywhere in the United States. With that, the Kim regime declared itself a nuclear power.
Kim Jong-un, who was now the leader of North Korea, and who had inherited power from his father, Kim Jong-il, and from his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, was in a position to threaten major nations.
Speaking with the North Koreans was useless. Signing treaties and agreements with them was useless. Words were meaningless. The other nations had to flex their military muscles in order to get the DPRK’s attention: Japan began increasing its military program and South Korea began to orchestrate military maneuvers as a public display of its ability to retaliate for any sneak attack by the North.
Ambassador Nikki Haley explains:
The North Koreans had openly stated that their missiles were intended to deliver nuclear weapons to strike cities in the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Now they unquestionably had the capacity to do so. It was as dangerous a situation as the United States had encountered in years. The air in Washington and New York was full of a constant, unsettling fear — that we were only one provocation away from a terrible conflict.
Together with Japan and South Korea, the United States demonstrated military preparedness. It showed that it was capable of returning maximum retaliation after any surprise attack by North Korea.
During the next few years after 2017, the DPRK did indeed reduce its threats to nearby nations — threats which were often delivered in the form of missile “tests.” These tests were not really tests — they were displays of power: a form of bullying.
But the reduction in the number of tests was mere cover. Secretly, North Korea continued to build more weapons.
North Korea has no allies, but it has at least a working relationship with China, more so than it has with any other nation. Even China, however, found it wise to put significant economic pressure on the DPRK.
The lesson is this: other nations must apply economic pressure and display military strength in order to obtain a meaningful change in the behavior of North Korea.
